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Article
The Need for Enforcement of U.S. Punitive
Damages Awards by the European Union
Jessica J. Berch*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR FREE TRADE IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENTS
Given the rapid and dramatic increase in international
transactions and the greater interdependence of nations within
the global community, it is vitally important to find ways to
enforce U.S. judgments in foreign countries. With some notable
exceptions, few hurdles impede the enforcement of
Several
compensatory damage judgments in civil cases.1
barriers, however, inhibit or preclude the enforcement of U.S.
punitive damages awards2 in foreign countries in general and in
* Associate, Perkins Coie Brown & Bain, P.A. Former law clerk to the Hon. Mary M.
Schroeder, Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. J.D., Columbia Law School,
2008. This Article was inspired by my work with articles of Professor John Gotanda
when I served as an Articles Editor on the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law.
I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Professor Lance Liebman, who tirelessly
helped me to develop this Article and to succeed at Columbia Law School.
1. “Ordinarily, it is a relatively routine matter to ask a foreign court to enforce
an American court judgment.” Adam Liptak, Foreign Courts Wary of U.S. Notion of
Punitive Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A1. One notable exception, which
is not the focus of this Article, is the category of judgments made pursuant to
expansive U.S. concepts of personal jurisdiction. Professor Weintraub notes that
many European Union Member States prohibit two bases for general jurisdiction
that are “widely regarded as exorbitant [by Member States]—service on a defendant
temporarily present in the jurisdiction (“tag” jurisdiction) and doing business [in the
jurisdiction].” RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 711
(4th ed. 2001). For the U.S. position on tag jurisdiction, see Burnham v. Superior
Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); on doing business, see Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
2. Punitive damages are monetary awards that do more than merely
compensate the plaintiff. See Francesco Quarta, Recognition and Enforcement of
U.S. Punitive Damages Awards in Continental Europe: The Italian Supreme Court’s
Veto, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 752, 754 (2008) (“[T]he purpose of punitive
damages is not compensation of the plaintiff for any detriment suffered, but rather
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European Union (E.U.) countries in particular.3 This Article
addresses the discrete problem of enforcing U.S. punitive
damages awards in the courts of E.U. Member States.4
In June of 2005, the United States signed the international
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Hague
Convention).5 The Hague Convention contains a provision that
allows signatory countries to decline to enforce punitive
damages awards rendered by other jurisdictions.6 While written
neutrally so that the enforcement difficulties run bilaterally, the
effect of the provision will be felt primarily by litigants from the
United States7 because of the United States’ long and vigorous
punishment of the wrongdoer.”). Judicial opinions, statutes, and treaties often
interchange the terms punitive and exemplary. This Article ordinarily employs the
term “punitive” to connote punitive and exemplary damages.
3. Current European Union Member States include the following: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and
Turkey are candidate countries. See European Union: Delegation of the European
Commission to the USA: Offices, http://www.eurunion.org/states/offices.htm (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009).
4. This Article does not address the wisdom of imposing punitive damages in
civil proceedings. This Article defers to the public policy of the jurisdiction that
renders the judgment. Foreign nations’ antagonism toward punitive damages
awards may spill over into enforcement proceedings and it is this topic that this
Article addresses, at least in the limited context of enforcement of U.S. punitive
damages awards in E.U. Member States.
5. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, reprinted in
44
I.L.M.
1294
(2005),
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=98 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The
Hague Convention has been ratified by Mexico alone and has not entered into force
in any country; however, whether Mexico refuses to enforce particular U.S.
judgments is beyond the scope of this Article. See Status Table 37: Convention of 30
June
2005
on
Choice
of
Court
Agreements,
http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
6. See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11 (stating that “[r]ecognition or
enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment
awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate
a party for actual loss or harm suffered.” In addition, “[t]he court addressed shall
take into account whether and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of
origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings.”).
7. See id. Note that the language of Article 11 does not say that “recognition
or enforcement of a judgment may be refused by E.U. Member States if, and to the
extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or punitive
damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered.” Thus, it
is possible that a U.S court might refuse to enforce a judgment from an E.U.
Member State. However, “most U.S. jurisdictions readily recognize and enforce the
judgments of other nations. . . .” Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement of Foreign
Money Judgments in the United States and Europe: How Can We Achieve a
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history of awarding punitive damages in civil suits.8 Although
the Convention covers a broader range of issues than the
enforcement of punitive damages judgments, this Article focuses
on that single aspect of the Hague Convention and argues that
the United States made a strategic mistake in agreeing to that
provision. This Article concludes that the United States should
seek to amend the Hague Convention to allow for more liberal
enforcement of judgments containing non-compensatory
damages.
The
non-enforcement-of-punitive-damages
provision
remains in the Hague Convention despite the fact that E.U.
Member States liberally enforce judgments of other E.U.
Member States under the Brussels Council Regulation on
Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Regulation).9 These
States, in turn, extend similar liberal enforcement to the
judgments of members of the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA)10 under the Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(Lugano Convention).11 As will be explored below, some of the
Comprehensive Treaty?, 23 REV. LITIG. 381, 383 (2004).
8. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620–21 (2008)
(discussing punitive damages in general); Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S.
Ct. 2561, 2573 (2009) (discussing punitive damages in maritime law).
9. Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1–23
(EC) [hereinafter Brussels Regulation]. The default in the Brussels Regulation is
the enforcement of judgments from other Member States. Only if a judgment is
“manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member States in which recognition is
sought” may the enforcing States decline enforcement. Id. art. 34.
10. The EFTA was established May 3, 1960 as an alternative for countries not
wishing to join the European Union. For information on the EFTA, see The
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), http://www.efta.int/ (last visited Nov.1,
2009).
11. See European Communities-European Free Trade Association: Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) [hereinafter
Lugano Convention]. Like the Brussels Regulation, the Lugano Convention also
provides for a baseline of enforcement. An EFTA member may decline to recognize a
judgment only in certain circumstances. Pertinent to this Article, an EFTA member
may refuse enforcement of a punitive damages judgment “if such recognition is
contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought.” Id. art. 27.
Thus, the Hague Convention, Brussels Regulation, and Lugano Convention
represent three different levels of ease of enforcement. The Hague Convention
allows non-recognition if the judgment contains punitive damages (whether or not
the judgment violates the enforcing State’s public policy). The Lugano Convention
does not specifically mention the enforcement of punitive damages judgments, but
allows non-recognition if a judgment is contrary to public policy. Finally, the
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judgments rendered within the European community contain
non-compensatory or punitive-seeming elements and yet are
still presumptively enforced, or are at least more readily
enforced, under the Brussels Regulation and the Lugano
Convention.12 By signing the Hague Convention, the United
States has signaled its willingness to permit its courts’
judgments to receive something less from E.U. Member States
than the respect routinely accorded by Member States to the
judgments of other Member States and EFTA countries’ courts.
This Article posits that the Hague Convention’s method of
dealing with punitive damages reflects misunderstandings by
both the United States and European Union. If the United
States and European Union had not labored under such
misunderstandings, the Hague Convention might evidence the
liberal enforcement policies incorporated into both the Brussels
Regulation and the Lugano Convention.
While negotiating the terms of the Hague Convention
relating to the enforcement of civil judgments, the United States
did not seem to appreciate that the internal jurisprudence of
several Member States had trended toward allowing noncompensatory damages, or at least toward permitting the
enforcement of judgments containing non-compensatory
damages.13 Such recognition of non-compensatory damages
should have strengthened the United States’ bargaining position
to request that Member States enforce U.S. judgments
containing punitive damages.14
For its part, the European Union did not seem to recognize,
and negotiators may not have highlighted, trends in the United
States toward limiting the amount of punitive damages doled
out and tying the amount of punitive damages to actual harm
suffered.15 The downward trend in U.S. punitive damages
Brussels Regulation does not single out punitive damages judgments, but allows
non-recognition of any judgment—including those containing punitive damages—if
the judgment is manifestly contrary to public policy.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Cf. Roberto Garza Barbosa, International Copyright Law and Litigation: A
Mechanism for Improvement, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 77, 109–12 (2007)
(discussing the failed negotiations over the Hague Convention).
14. Professor Gotanda agrees: “While these developments [in the European
Union] do not point toward clear sailing for acceptance of American punitive
damages abroad, when viewed together they may foreshadow a change in the wind
that may ultimately lead to greater enforcement of foreign awards of these
damages.” John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages:
Is the Tide Changing?, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 508–09 (2007).
15. See Barbosa, supra note 13, at 109 (discussing the fact that “fear of U.S.
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awards indicates that the Member States have little to fear
about runaway U.S. juries imposing massive punitive damages
awards unguided by any principles of law or of equity.
Given the rapid increase in international business
transactions and the need for international enforcement of
damage awards,16 that such misunderstandings could be
codified in the Hague Convention is troubling. Had the United
States and the European Union recognized that current trends
tend to diminish the differences in attitudes regarding punitive
damages between the two powers, the Hague Convention’s stark
limitations on the enforcement of judgments containing punitive
damages may not have been enacted. Because the Hague
Convention,
if
ratified,
limits—perhaps
eliminates—
international enforcement of punitive damages awards, the
United States should seek to amend the punitive damages
provision so that the next iteration of the Hague Convention
provides for the liberal enforcement policy of the Brussels
Regulation or the Lugano Convention.17 At a minimum, the
Hague Convention, if amended, should lower the hurdle for U.S.
litigants seeking to enforce punitive damages awards in the
countries signing onto the Hague Convention.
In an
international marketplace, where a tortfeasor’s assets may not
be situated in the same country as that in which the initial
judgment was rendered, more judgment-creditors may come to
rely on international enforcement of their judgments; and there
should be free trade in the enforcement of judgments, including
monetary damages awards” stunted the original negotiations over the Hague
Convention). For a discussion of recent trends involving the United States’ policy on
punitive damages, see infra Part II.
16. See Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full Court Press: International
Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes,
40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2007); see also Jocelyn H. Bush, Comment, To
Abstain or not to Abstain?: A New Framework for the Application of the Abstention
Doctrine in International Parallel Proceedings, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 128 (2008)
(discussing the global market).
17. Although the Hague Convention does not mandate the non-recognition of
punitive damages awards, it gives Member States liberal license to refuse
recognition. As long as the judgment contains punitive damages, the enforcing State
may refuse to recognize the judgment. That the Hague Convention does not require
non-enforcement is of little consequence, as it is highly unlikely that any convention
would mandate non-recognition. But see Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 34
(A judgment “shall not be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to
public policy in the Member States in which recognition is sought.” (emphasis
added)). Of course, the Brussels Regulation only mandates non-enforcement where
the judgment “manifestly” violates public policy, so the default is not pure nonrecognition.
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judgments containing punitive damages components.18
It is troubling that the Hague Convention does not do a
better job of ensuring free trade in the enforcement of
judgments. The Hague Convention’s grudging attitude toward
punitive damages is unfortunate for the United States,19 given
the E.U. Member States’ willingness to enforce each others’ noncompensatory damages awards through the Brussels Regulation
and Lugano Convention. The Hague Convention discriminates
against U.S. plaintiffs’ interests,20 which discourages efficiency,
uniformity of treatment, and comity in a world of increasingly
multinational transactions.21
This Article will explore the enforcement of U.S. punitive
damages awards in the European Union. First, it will address
current U.S. trends toward restricting punitive damages
18. Free trade in enforcement would allow judgment-creditors to follow the
tortfeasor’s assets, wherever those may lie.
19. The attitude is unfortunate, though perhaps not unexpected given the thenPresident’s view of punitive damages. President George W. Bush’s administration
was both pro-business and anti-punitive damages. See generally Jenni Khuu
Katzer, A Tale of Two Liberals: Departure at Supreme Court Review of Punitive
Damages, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 625, 674 (2008); John T. Nockelby & Shannon
Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1033–34 (2005). For example, President George W. Bush
proposed a cap of $250,000 on all non-economic damages in medical malpractice
lawsuits. See Robert Pear, Bush Begins Drive to Limit Malpractice Suit Awards,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A18.
20. Fortunately, U.S. interests should not be harmed inordinately by the
Hague Convention’s grudging attitude toward punitive damages. Many defendants
against whom these U.S. punitive damages awards are granted should have assets
in the United States. If the defendant has sufficient assets within the borders of the
United States to satisfy the entire judgment, the judgment-creditor will not have to
look outside the United States for enforcement of the judgment. By way of example,
the litigation following the Exxon Valdez oil spill resulted in the fourth largest
punitive damages award in U.S. history, Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 568
F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009), yet the plaintiffs never had to look outside the
United States for satisfaction of that judgment. Exxon had sufficient assets in the
United States to satisfy both the judgment and the interest on the judgment.
Moreover, as long as the defendant can cover the punitive portion of the damages
award with assets located in the United States, one wonders whether the U.S. court
enforcing the judgment may allocate the seized assets to the punitive portion of the
judgment, leaving the compensatory relief to litigation in the foreign country. The
foreign jurisdiction might allow enforcement therein because the money would go to
satisfy the compensatory portion of the award and not to the punitive portion.
21. Before the Hague Convention, some scholars had posited that because the
United States liberally enforces other countries’ judgments, those countries had
little to gain by acting in a reciprocal manner. See generally Danford, supra note 7;
Franklin O. Ballard, Turnabout Is Fair Play: Why a Reciprocity Requirement Should
Be Included in the America Law Institute’s Proposed Federal Statute, 28 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 199 (2006).
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awards, which have been undertaken by both judicial and
legislative bodies in both the federal and state arenas.22 Second,
the current European trend toward accepting non-compensatory
damages, or at least the enforcement of judgments containing
non-compensatory damages, will be discussed. Third, this
Article will demonstrate that European countries have entered
into treaties that allow liberal enforcement of each others’
judgments, even if those judgments contain non-compensatory
damages. Fourth, it will show that the Hague Convention does
not extend liberal enforcement to U.S. judgments by E.U.
Member States and, indeed, even allows those European
countries with a robust non-compensatory damages
jurisprudence to deny enforcement of U.S. punitive damages
judgments.
Finally, this Article will conclude that the next iteration of
the Hague Convention should contain a more liberal
enforcement policy than it currently does, perhaps even the
same liberal enforcement policy that the Brussels Regulation or
the Lugano Convention provide for E.U. Member States’
judgments and EFTA judgments. In a transnational world, U.S.
judgments deserve nothing more, but nothing less, than the

22. Unless otherwise provided, while referring to “punitive damages,” this
Article does not distinguish between judgments rendered by state courts and those
rendered by federal courts. Nor does it distinguish punitive damages based on
statutory or common-law principles, nor between those awards based on an
underlying state or federal law. The term “punitive damages” includes awards doled
out by juries, judges, and arbitrators, and those consensual awards rendered
pursuant to agreements. For the purposes of this Article, the term “punitive
damages” usually does not distinguish between pure punitive damages, multiplied
damages, or capped awards. Pure punitive damages allow untrammeled jury
discretion and bear no relation to the compensatory damages given, although even
those awards are cabined by the reasonableness standard embodied in the Due
Process Clause. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003); see generally Serena Antonia Luisa Corongiu, Punitive Damages Awards in
the U.S. Judicial Experience and Their Recognition in Italy 5 (2004–05)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Università Degli Studi di Urbino) (on file with
author) (describing pure punitive damages).
Multiplied damages are the
compensatory damages multiplied by a particular factor to render an amount of
punitive damages. See id. at 6. Usually that factor is two or three. See DAN B.
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 358 (2d ed. 1993) (describing multiple tier damages).
Capped awards are punitive damages that are constrained by a statutory upper
limit. See generally id. at 349. This Article discusses punitive damages in civil cases
and does not reach the issue of the enforcement of criminal fines—which may be
punitive in nature—in foreign countries. Nor does this Article discuss the
enforcement in E.U. countries of U.S. court-issued sanctions of miscreant party
behavior under doctrines such as Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991),
despite the fact that such sanctions are often punitive.
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respect European countries routinely accord to the judgments of
Member States and EFTA countries.23
II. THE UNITED STATES REINS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDS
The judicial and legislative bodies in both the federal and
state governments have, in recent years, become active in
restricting punitive damages. The United States Supreme
Court, lower federal courts, state courts, Congress, and state
legislatures have all taken part in this movement to reduce the
number of punitive damages judgments and the amounts
awarded in punitive damages judgments.24 As a preliminary
step toward decreasing punitive damages amounts, some courts
limited an award of punitive damages to an amount reasonably
related to actual damages.25 Congress and the state legislatures
have enacted statutes that limit punitive damages through
The following
absolute dollar caps or ratio limitations.26
sections survey the movement away from unbridled jury
discretion in the punitive damages arena.27
23. The signal that the United States is willing to accept less is troubling.
Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11. Article 2 contains a list of exemptions
to the scope of the Hague Convention, but the broadest exemptions (those found
in Article (2)(1)(a)) only apply to the recognition of exclusive choice of court
agreements and were put in place to protect the weaker party to a lawsuit. Id.
art. 2. Even if the Convention has limited impact due to its exclusions from
coverage, the United States should nonetheless seek to amend or eliminate the
discriminatory provision.

24. See infra Part II.A for discussion on the United States Supreme Court’s
role in restricting punitive damages, Part II.B for discussion on lower federal courts’
and state courts’ roles, and Part II.C for discussion on state legislatures’ and
Congress’s roles.
25. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda, Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987) (noting that “any punitive damage award must bear a reasonable
relation to the actual damages” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
26. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D) (2006)
(enacting a dollar cap based on the number of employees). This statute enables
punitive damages for Title VII and other actions in which the claims rest on
discrimination based on federally protected classes (race, gender, etc.). Id. §
1981a(b)(1). The damages increase on a step basis according to how many
employees the employer has. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D).
27. Substantial literature addresses punitive damages in the United States.
Many scholars defend punitive damages as good social policy. See, e.g., STEPHEN
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 202–04
(1995); Michael L. Rustad, How the Common Good is Served by the Remedy of
Punitive Damages, 64 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1997). Although the United States may
limit the availability and amount of punitive damages awards, it is unlikely that the
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Recently, the United States Supreme Court has become
more amenable to restricting the punitive portion of jury
awards.28 The Supreme Court typically relies on the Due
Process Clause to curb pure punitive damages arising from
“unbridled jury discretion” or “runaway juries.”29
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, for example,
the jury award of $1,040,000 to the plaintiff “contained a
punitive damages component of not less than $840,000.”30 The
Supreme Court rejected the notion that punitive damages
always violate the Due Process Clause and proceeded to inquire
whether this particular punitive-to-compensatory damages
ratio, four-to-one, violated due process principles.31 The Court
reasoned that it could not “draw a mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit every case,” but the Court
ultimately concluded that the punitive damages awarded in this

United States will completely eliminate this remedy.
28. Because the current Supreme Court jurisprudence limits punitive damages
awards pursuant to the Due Process Clause, this section begins with Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), instead of what may be the more
traditional starting point of Browning Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (rejecting an attack on punitive damages
predicated on the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment). In Browning
Ferris, the Court noted in dictum that the proper clause under which to review
punitive damages awards in civil cases is the Due Process Clause. See id. at 276
(“There is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due Process Clause
places outer limits on the size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a
statutory scheme.”). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment similarly
prohibits the deprivation of property without due process: “[N]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
29. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 7; see also id. at 15 (explaining that the traditional
common-law method for determining punitive damages allows the jury to consider
the gravity of the defendant’s conduct and the need to deter future similar acts).
The Supreme Court does rely on other principles, in addition to the Due Process
Clause, to cabin punitive damages awards. For example, in Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, the Supreme Court relied on maritime law to announce a restriction on
punitive damages awards premised on reckless behavior. See Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620–21 (2008) (“We granted certiorari to consider whether
. . . the punitive damages awarded against Exxon in this case were excessive as a
matter of maritime common law.” (citation omitted)).
30. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 6 & n.2.
31. See id. at 17–19.
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particular case did not violate due process.32
Although the Supreme Court seemed to struggle to affirm
the four-to-one punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio in
Haslip—at times relying on the fact that punitive damages have
a long history and at other times deferring to the jury’s
determination33—a mere two years later, the Court upheld a
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio of 526-to-one.34 In
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the jury
awarded $19,000 in compensatory damages to Alliance
Resources for defending a frivolous lawsuit and awarded an
additional $10 million in punitive damages.35 The Supreme
Court again refused to draw a mathematical bright line
delineating the constitutionally allowable amount of punitive
damages.36 Instead, after examining the jury’s award for
reasonableness, the Court upheld this staggering punitive
damages judgment.37
Seemingly contradictorily, just three years after affirming
the 526-to-one ratio in TXO, in BMW of North America v. Gore,
the Court refused to uphold a 500-to-one punitive-tocompensatory ratio in a fraud action brought against a car
manufacturer.38 In BMW, the Supreme Court held that $2
million dollars in punitive damages for $4000 in actual damages
for a botched paint job on a new car was “grossly excessive.”39
32. Id. at 17–18.
33. See id. at 16–17.
34. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993) (noting the
526-to-one disparity).
35. See id. at 446. This case demonstrates an award of pure punitive damages,
as opposed to multiplied damages. Counsel for the defendant noted that the “jury
was left to their own devices” in determining the amount of punitive damages. Id. at
451.
36. See id. at 456 (rejecting the “parties’ desire to formulate a ‘test’ for
determining whether a particular punitive award is ‘grossly excessive’”).
37. See id. at 458, 462, 466.
38. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The original jury verdict in
this case could be viewed as a quasi-multiplied punitive damages award. Although
there was no statute requiring or authorizing a multiplied award (which is
necessary for an actual multiplied punitive damages award), the jury initially came
up with the punitive damages figure by multiplying the plaintiff’s compensatory
damage award by the number of people whom BMW had defrauded. See generally
id. at 567. One problem with allowing juries to consider the harm to nonparties is
that other future juries can award punitive damages awards based on the same
considerations, thus allowing multiple verdicts against a defendant for the harm to
the same group of people.
39. See id. Perhaps the Court was persuaded that a BMW owner whose car
has only minor cosmetic damage is not a particularly sympathetic plaintiff entitled
to millions of dollars of punitive damages.
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In holding the punitive damages violative of the Due
Process Clause, the Supreme Court set forth factors to aid
courts in determining whether future punitive damages awards
are “grossly excessive”: (1) the reprehensibility of the conduct;
(2) the disparity between the compensatory damages and the
punitive damages; and (3) the difference between the punitive
damages and the remedy authorized by or imposed in
comparable cases.40 Although these factors still permit juries to
award punitive damages, even large awards of punitive
damages, the Court finally set forth some guidelines for courts
to follow in determining whether a particular jury award was
too extravagant. The articulation of standards suggested that,
in the future, trial judges could constrain juries’ discretion and
that reviewing courts could feel more comfortable finding
punitive damages grossly excessive.41
Then, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that federal appellate courts
should use a de novo standard for reviewing the
constitutionality of punitive damages.42 This de novo standard
sent a clear message to all federal reviewing courts in the
United States that federal courts must actively review punitive
damages awards and cannot mask decisions by resort to the
more deferential abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous
standards.43 The de novo standard of review, coupled with the
40. See id. at 574–75.
41. Jury discretion will be confined in the first instance by the trial judge’s
instructions. After BMW, these instructions should reflect the factors set forth in
the Supreme Court’s opinion that significantly limit a jury’s discretion in awarding
punitive damages. Moreover, after BMW, reviewing courts can throw out or reduce
a punitive damages judgment for failing to reflect the Supreme Court’s three factors.
42. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436
(2001) (“Our decisions in analogous cases, together with the reasoning that produced
those decisions, thus convince us that courts of appeals should apply a de novo
standard of review when passing on district courts’ determinations of the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards.”).
43. In the abstract, the de novo standard may cut both ways. A lower court
could throw out a jury’s award of punitive damages and a higher court could
reinstate the award (by not deferring to the lower court’s decision). In practice,
however, the de novo review seems designed to guarantee the constitutional rights
of the defendant against an award of excessive damages. See generally Amanda L.
Maxfield, Comments, Punitive Damages: Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group: Will a Constitutional Objection to the Excessiveness of a Punitive Damages
Award Save Defendants from Oklahoma's Punitive Damages Statute?, 55 OKLA. L.
REV. 449 (2002); id. at 487 (“[T]he defendant's last chance to have a punitive
damages award reduced may be to seek substantive de novo review of the award by
an appellate court as guaranteed by the Cooper decision.”); MICHAEL B. HYMAN &
MELINDA J. MORALES, POUNDING OUT THE LIMITS OF LEATHERMAN TOOL: CASES
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BMW factors for determining reasonableness of punitive
damages awards, enabled courts to more closely examine
punitive damages awards.44
The reining-in process continued in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.45 State Farm involved a
lethal car accident in which the defendant-insurer refused to
settle the civil case within the policy’s limits, thereby exposing
the insured to personal liability.46 The insured sued State Farm
for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.47 The jury awarded the insured $2.6 million in
compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages;
the trial court reduced the awards to $1 million and $25 million
respectively.48 The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the jury’s
$145 million punitive damages award.49 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the punitive damages
under the de novo standard of review from Cooper Industries
and the three factors from BMW,50 and the Court concluded that
the 145-to-one punitive-to-compensatory ratio violated due
process.51
In State Farm, the Supreme Court clarified the second
BMW factor, explaining that “in practice, few awards exceeding
a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
Thus, the Court
damages . . . will satisfy due process.”52
apparently imposed the mathematical bright line it had refused
to set in earlier cases: the punitive-to-compensatory ratio should

TESTING THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE
AWARDS, 2 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS (2002) (discussing
the fact that defendants wish to expand the scope of Cooper Industries v.
Leatherman Tool so that the de novo standard would apply to all challenges to
punitive damages awards). Therefore, an appellate court would be unlikely to
overturn a trial court’s finding of excessiveness.
44. Cooper Industries itself noted the de novo appellate review was necessary to
permit “‘appellate courts . . . to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal
principles.’” Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 697 (1996)); see also Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on
Sentencing Facts After Booker: What the Seventh Amendment can Teach the Sixth,
39 GA. L. REV. 895, 936 (2005) (noting that, after Cooper Industries, a judge has the
“ultimate power to set an amount of punishment”).
45. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
46. See id. at 412–13.
47. Id. at 414.
48. Id. at 415.
49. Id. at 415–16.
50. See id. at 418.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 425.
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be less than or equal to nine-to-one.53 The timing of the State
Farm opinion is noteworthy: it was rendered on April 7, 2003,
approximately twenty-six months before the signing of the
Hague Convention, which occurred on June 30, 2005.54 Plainly,
more than two years before the Hague Convention, U.S. courts
had voluntarily limited punitive damages to a nine-to-one ratio
with respect to compensatory damages.
Two years after the signing of the Hague Convention, the
United States Supreme Court again revisited the subject of
punitive damages awards. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, a
jury awarded $79.5 million in punitive damages to the widow of
a lifelong smoker;55 the jury also awarded her $821,485.50 in
The trial court reduced the
compensatory damages.56
compensatory award to $521,485.80 and the punitive award to
$32 million.57 Both parties appealed to the Oregon Supreme
Court.58 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
State Farm that the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages should rarely exceed the single digits, the Oregon
Supreme Court found that a ratio ranging from ninety-seven-toone (if the compensatory damages are $821,485.50) to 152-toone (if the compensatory damages are $521,485.80) passed
constitutional muster.59 The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned
that neither the nine-to-one ratio nor the BMW factors
constituted “bright-line tests.”60
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme
Court’s judgment.61 Philip Morris argued to the Supreme Court
that the Oregon state courts failed to apply the BMW factors
and that the punitive damages award was grossly excessive and
certainly outside of the single-digit ratio assumed to be
53. Many law review articles have characterized State Farm as generally
creating a nine-to-one punitive-to-compensatory damages bright line. See, e.g.,
Supreme Court 2002 Term, Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 317, 324 (2003);
Michael Kahlenberg, Broken Record Lawmaking and Stare Decisis: The
Unconstitutionality of Ohio’s Latest Tort Reform Effort, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 1087,
1096 (2006).
54. The Hague Convention was concluded June 30, 2005, Hague Convention,
supra note 5; State Farm was issued April 7, 2003, 538 U.S. at 408.
55. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 P.3d 1165, 1171 (Or. 2006), vacated,
549 U.S. 346 (2007).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1176–82.
60. Id. at 1177–82.
61. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353, 357 (2007).
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appropriate in State Farm.62 The Supreme Court, however, did
not reach those issues,63 finding instead that the punitive
damages award was impermissibly high because the Oregon
courts had improperly allowed the jury to speculate about harm
to nonparties and to include that harm in the punitive damages
award.64 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case
because of the jury’s improper consideration of harm to
nonparties.65 Although the Supreme Court’s opinion could have
made a stronger statement against excessive punitive damages
awards in general, the Supreme Court nonetheless believed that
the punitive damages in the case might be reduced on remand.66
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed down a
strong statement against large punitive damages awards,67 but
not in the context of due process limitations. In Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, the Court held that a one-to-one ratio of punitiveto-compensatory damages is a “fair upper limit” in maritime
cases involving reckless behavior.68 In so doing, the majority
62.

Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.
64. Id. at 353, 357. The plaintiff’s attorney had appealed to the jury’s emotion,
asking it to consider, “How many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the
State of Oregon there have been?” and suggesting that Philip Morris was responsible
for one-third of all smoking-related deaths. Id. at 350–51. This is reminiscent of
BMW, in which the jury awarded the plaintiff damages based on harm to other car
buyers. See supra note 38.
65. Id. at 352.
66. Id. at 357–58 (noting that when the Oregon Supreme Court applies the
correct standard to the case the result may be the reduction in the punitive damages
award). The Supreme Court’s prediction did not, however, come to pass. On
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court found an adequate and independent state law
ground for refusing to give Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction. Williams v.
Philip Morris Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1260 (Or. 2008). The defendant filed a petition for
writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which contended that it was
improper for the state court to use state grounds to sidestep the Supreme Court’s
remand order. The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari in part, Phillip
Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008) (mem.), but later dismissed
certiorari as having been improvidently granted, Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams
129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (per curiam).
67. But see Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing
Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 24–43 (2009). Professor Jeffrey L. Fisher
disagrees that Exxon Shipping Co. represents a strong statement against large
punitive damages judgments. Professor Fisher contends that, in Exxon Shipping
Co., the Supreme Court is asking legislatures to regularize punitive damages. He
argues that the Court is signaling that, once legislatures do regularize punitive
damages awards, the Supreme Court—and other courts—will accede to such
legislative determinations of the proper amount of punitive damages judgments. Id.
at 24–43. At least in the context of Exxon Shipping, however, Professor Fisher’s
argument seems incorrect because of the Court’s authority over maritime law.
68. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008). When Exxon

63.
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decreased the punitive damages allotted from the $5 billion jury
award, already reduced to $2.5 billion by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, to $507.5 million, the amount of compensatory
damages at issue in the case according to the presiding Alaska
District Court.69 The Supreme Court announced that this oneto-one ratio was necessary “given the need to protect against the
possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of
awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary.”70 Accordingly,
the Court showed that in the limited common-law realm where
it truly reigns supreme, it supports drastically limiting the size
of punitive damages awards.
In Exxon Shipping, the Supreme Court also recognized the
international implications of its opinion. The Court noted that
“punitive damages overall are higher and more frequent in the
United States than they are anywhere else.”71 The Court cited
statistics regarding the use of punitive damages in other
countries,72 and then noted that U.S. juries have exercised
“overall restraint” with respect to punitive damages awards.73
Exxon Shipping itself, which limits punitive damages to a oneto-one ratio with respect to compensatory damages, evidences
that the Supreme Court too is willing to exercise “overall
petitioned the U.S Supreme Court for certiorari, Exxon noted in its brief that even
the $2.5 billion punitive damages award—decreased from its original $5 billion—
was “larger than the total of all punitive damages awards affirmed by all federal
appellate courts in our history.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Exxon Shipping
Co., 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219), 2007 WL 2383784. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit for entry of judgment in accordance with its opinion that punitive
damages should never exceed compensatory damages in a maritime case involving
recklessness. The parties stipulated to the entry of judgment in the amount of
$507.5 million in punitive damages.
Article 2 of the Hague Convention provides that the Convention does not apply to
marine pollution or limitations of liability for maritime claims. Hague Convention,
supra note 5, art. 2(2)(g). Therefore, the Supreme Court's holding in the Exxon
Shipping Co. case may not directly apply to the Convention's provisions on enforcing
punitive damages. It is, however, indicative of the United States’ shift towards a
more restrained approach to punitive damages.
69. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (citing In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F.
Supp. 2d 1043, 1063 (D. Alaska 2002)).
70. Id. at 2633.
71. Id. at 2623 (citing John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative
Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 421 (2004)).
72. Id. at 2623–24.
73. Id. at 2624 (noting that “[a] survey of the literature reveals that discretion
to award punitive damages has not mass-produced runaway awards, and although
some studies show the dollar amounts of punitive-damages awards growing over
time, even in real terms, by most accounts the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory awards has remained less than 1:1.”).

DO NOT DELETE

70

11/19/2009 1:14 PM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:1

restraint” in the award of punitive damages.
But more importantly, at least for the purposes of this
Article, is the Supreme Court’s awareness of how other
countries view U.S. punitive damages awards. If the Court
fears negative international reaction to high punitive damages
awards, perhaps the Court will continue to actively police such
awards. In any event, lower courts and state courts should pick
up the vibrations, even if the Supreme Court’s limited docket
does not allow it to flesh out its punitive damages jurisprudence
to a significant extent.
B. LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE COURTS
All damage awards are subject to review under the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in the cases
discussed above.74 Even before the Supreme Court became
active in supervising punitive damages awards, state courts
attempted to control punitive damages by requiring that the
punitive damages awarded bear a reasonable relationship to the
compensatory damage award.75 These courts relied principally
on their states’ constitutions in attempting to restrict the
amount of punitive damages awarded.76
Court decisions—both federal and state—subject punitive
damages awards to further expansions and limitations.77 For
74. See supra Part II.A; see also Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2626 (noting
that its due process cases have “all involved awards subject in the first instance to
state law.”).
75. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 343 nn.1–2; see also Palmer v. Ted Stevens
Honda, Inc., 238 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (“[I]t remains the law, as
the jury was instructed here, that any punitive damages award must bear a
reasonable relation to the actual damages.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis, & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn. 1980)
(“Since the amount of punitive damages to award is a decision that is almost
exclusively within the province of the jury, we will not disturb the award on appeal
unless it is so excessive as to be unreasonable.”).
76. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800–01 (Utah 1991) (noting that
punitive damages must comport with the excessive fines and due process provisions
of the Utah State Constitution, but refusing to reach the state constitutional issue
because the defendant had waived its right to present that issue on appeal); see also
Roberts v. Ford Aerospace & Commc’n Corp., 274 Cal. Rptr. 139, 146–47 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990), overruled on different grounds by Coll. Hosp. Inc., v. Superior Court, 882
P.2d 894 (Cal. 1994) (finding that an award of $750,000 in punitive damages for
$295,224.09 in compensatory damages did not deprive the defendant corporation of
its due process rights under the state constitution).
77. For statutory limitations, see infra Part II.C. The Exxon Valdez litigation
saga exemplifies both expansions and contractions of punitive damages awards. The
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example, a few states only recognize punitive damages
authorized by statute.78 The courts in these states disallow
punitive damages as part of the organic common law absent
explicit statutory authorization.79 Another example relates to
the standard of proof for establishing punitive damages awards.
Traditionally, punitive damages were established by the
ordinary civil standard, preponderance of the evidence, but
many courts now require that punitive damages be established
Requiring statutory
by clear and convincing evidence.80
authorization for punitive damages and imposing a heightened
burden of proof before allowing punitive damages both tend to
restrict the frequency and amount of punitive damages
awards.81
A third example of the common law development shaping
punitive damages awards relates to the proof of the defendant’s
financial condition. Punitive damages are meant, at least in
part, to punish the defendant.82 Thus, it makes sense for the
Alaska District Court that conducted the trial increased punitive damages from $4
billion to $4.5 billion following a remand from the Ninth Circuit. See In re Exxon
Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075, 1110 (D. Alaska 2004), judgment vacated, Exxon
Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). The Supreme Court opinion that vacated the
District Court’s judgment, in turn, exemplifies a federal court reducing a punitive
damages award under common law notions. 128 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (“Our review of
punitive damages today, then, considers not their intersection with the Constitution,
but the desirability of regulating them as a common law remedy for which
responsibility lies with this Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of
statute.”). Thus, within a single case, we see both expansions and contractions of
punitive damages awards.
78. See DOBBS, supra note 22, at 313 (citing cases in n. 28).
79. See Crowley v. Global Realty, Inc., 474 A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984)
(explaining that “[t]he general rule is therefore that the measure of damages
recoverable for misrepresentation, whether intentional or negligent, is actual
pecuniary loss,” and citing the rule of New Hampshire as not allowing punitive
damages for deterrence purposes).
80. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 328; see also Michael L. Rustad, The Supreme
Court and Me: Trapped in Time with Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L. J. 783, 803
(2008). The burden of proof may be either a legislative or a common-law change.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 6-11-20(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring proof by clear
and convincing evidence); GA. CODE ANN. § 61-12-5.1(b) (2000) (also requiring clear
and convincing evidence). The overlap of roles is evidence that courts and
legislatures are both involved in policing punitive damages awards. Legislatures
may become even more involved in the aftermath of Exxon Shipping Co. See Fisher,
supra note 67, at 24–43.
81. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., I'll Take That: Legal and Public Policy
Problems Raised by Statutes that Require Punitive Damages Awards to be Shared
with the State, 68 MO. L. REV. 525, 557 (2003); Judith Camile Glasscock, Emptying
the Deep Pocket in Mass Tort Litigation, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 977, 1011–12 (1987)
(discussing the higher burden of proof).
82. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2628.
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amount of damages to relate to the defendant’s financial
condition. Smaller awards will punish only those defendants
who have little, while larger awards will be necessary to punish
those who have more resources. Accordingly, some jurisdictions
either allow or require a plaintiff to present evidence of the
defendant’s financial condition.83 Both approaches enable a
court to appropriately gauge the level of damages necessary to
punish the defendant.
The desire to control punitive damages, and plaintiffs’
attorneys countervailing desire to retain a more expansive
punitive damages jurisprudence, has extended beyond the
intellectual and legal realms to the political sphere. Thirtyeight states elect their supreme court judges,84 and studies
suggest not only that those judges’ positions on punitive
damages may affect the outcomes of those elections ex ante,85
but also that contributions made to judges’ campaigns may
influence the judges’ positions on punitive damages ex post.86
One may surmise that if big business donates generously to
judges’ election campaigns, judges may find creative ways to
continue to decrease the numbers of punitive damages awards
83. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 329 nn.6–7 (citing Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d
1348 (Cal. 1991); Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1984); Nelson v. Jacobsen,
669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)).
84. Rachel Janutis, Fair Apportionment of Multiple Punitive Damages, 75
MISS. L.J. 367, 425 (2006).
85. Id. at 426 (“[E]ntities subject to punitive damages wield some political
influence over judges reviewing punitive damages awards.”); see also Schwartz et al.,
supra note 81, at 541 (“Even the most well-intentioned judge may find a large
punitive damages verdict easier to accept if the judge knows that the award will
help reduce the tax burden on voters in his or her county or support a good cause.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
86. Mike France et al., The Battle Over the Courts, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE,
Sept.
27,
2004,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_39/
b3901001_mz001.htm. The article reports that 4% of judges questioned said that
contributions had “a great deal of influence” on their decisions, 22% said “some
influence,” and 20% said “just a little influence.” That judges are influenced by
campaign contributions has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as
a due process problem, at least in certain exceptional circumstances. Caperton v.
Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). In Caperton v. Massey Coal, a jury
returned a $50 million verdict against the defendant, Massey Coal. Id. at 2256.
When the case made its way to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the
result was a 3-2 vote to reverse. Id. A judge who had received “campaign
contributions in an extraordinary amount” from Massey Coal cast the deciding vote
in Massey Coal’s favor. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause
required the judge to recuse himself under the circumstances of the case. Id. at
2257. Other cases of undue influence, however, may well be less visible, as the
majority itself recognized. Id. at 2256 (discussing the “extraordinary amount” of the
campaign contribution).

DO NOT DELETE

11/19/2009 1:14 PM

2010] ENFORCING U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE E.U.

73

or, at least, the amounts of those awards that do come to pass.87
Of course, courts are not the primary movers in limiting
punitive damages awards. As the dissenters in Exxon Shipping
noted, legislatures, rather than the courts, have the primary
responsibility in shaping punitive damages awards.88
Accordingly, it is legislatures who typically make empirical
judgments about the amount of damages permissible in classes
of cases.89 The next section, therefore, examines how elected
lawmakers—state legislators and members of Congress—control
punitive damages by statute.
C. CONGRESS AND STATE LEGISLATURES
Legislatures, both state and federal, have employed various
devices in an attempt to constrain jury discretion, regularize the
amount of punishment, and limit large punitive damages
awards. While some statutes may place no explicit restrictions
on punitive damages,90 other statutes may disallow punitive
damages in certain types of actions.91 Still others take a middle
87. For example, at oral argument for State Farm v. Campbell, Justice
Kennedy remarked that corporations fear the legal system because of the threat of
runaway punitive damages. This comment is quoted in PUNITIVE DAMAGES AFTER
CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM, 2 ALTA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS
(2003) (quoting Kennedy, J., as saying “Part of the harm to the larger community
here is the image that this does to the judicial system when corporations,
businesses, people of substance want to use the courts and they’re deterred from
doing it by the threat of runaway punitive damages, and that is not good for the
legal system.”) Others have also noted that businesses fear the possibility of large
punitive awards. Richard Chernick et al., The Future of Commercial Arbitration, 9
PEPP. DISPUTE RESOL. L.J. 415, 431 (“[W]aiving punitive damages is a common
provision in commercial arbitration agreements, and businesses find that waiver to
be valuable because it reduces the stakes of the typical commercial dispute so that
both sides are able to have an adjudication in a setting that doesn’t have that effect
of [a] potential award of punitive damages.”).
88. Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2634 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I believe that Congress, rather than this Court, should make
the empirical judgments expressed in Part IV [regarding the 1:1 ratio].”); see also id.
at 2637 (noting that the 1:1 ratio is the sort of thing “typically imposed by
legislatures, not courts.”).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(f)(2)(B) (2006) (criminal child abuse statute
authorizing civil compensatory and punitive damages); 25 U.S.C. § 305e(b) (2006)
(“In addition to the relief specified in subsection (a) of this section, the court may
award punitive damages and the costs of suit and a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
This is not to say that the court cannot infer such restrictions from the language of
the statute, from common-law precepts, or from constitutional principles.
91. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (2006) (“No court may award punitive damages
in any action with respect to a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation against
a person on behalf of whom the United States is obligated to make payments under
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course and define the situations in which punitive damages may
be appropriate.92
Many statutes allow punitive damages, but subject them to
explicit limitations.93 Legislatures generally enact two types of
statutes: multiplier statutes94 and cap statutes.95 Cap and
multiplier statutes, in conjunction with the judicial trend in
limiting those punitive damages that escape any statutory
limitations, currently depress and constrain U.S. punitive
damages awards. 96
I. Multiplier Statutes

Multiplier statutes function in an obvious manner. The
punitive damages component of an award can be no greater
than some multiple of the compensatory damage award.97 The
use of multiplier statutes tends to show that policymakers in the
United States fear unbridled jury discretion, but at the same
time recognize the strong public policy in deterring certain
an agreement of indemnification covering such incident or evacuation.”).
92. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(h)(7)(A)(iii) (2006) (“[I]f the violation is found to
have been willful, intentional, and without good faith, [the court may allow] . . .
punitive damages . . . together with the costs of the action and reasonable attorney’s
fees as determined by the court.”).
93. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D) (2006)
(placing a sliding scale cap on punitive damages depending on the number of
workers employed by the defendant corporation).
94. These multiplier statutes—allowing or requiring a compensatory award to
be multiplied by a particular factor to arrive at the punitive award—hearken back to
Roman times. As Serena Corongiu notes in her doctoral dissertation, “In some
peculiar cases [in ancient Rome] damages were calculated by doubling the actual
damages suffered by the victim (duplum) or by multiplying them per three (triplum)
or per four (quadruplum).” Corongiu, supra note 22, at 7.
95. Exxon Shipping Co., v. Baker 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2629 (2008) (noting that
many states enact a “hard dollar cap” or a “ratio or maximum multiple” for punitive
damages).
96. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433
(2001) (“[L]egislatures enjoy broad discretion in authorizing and limiting permissible
punitive damages awards. A good many States have enacted statutes that place
limits on the permissible size of punitive damages awards.” (internal citation and
footnote omitted)).
97. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2007) (twoto-one ratio in most tort cases); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17020(f) (2008) (greater of threeto-one ratio or $500,000 in most cases); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (2006) (three-to-one
ratio). For example, if the factfinder awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, a
multiplier statute might allow that amount to be doubled, yielding as much as a
$200,000 punitive award for a $300,000 total award. Under typical multiplier
statutes, while a factfinder may award less than $200,000 in punitive damages, it
cannot award more. But see DOBBS, supra note 22, at 349 (suggesting that, in some
situations, the jury could award more).
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aberrant antisocial conduct.98 Accordingly, multiplier statutes
seek to punish the defendant within a range that has been
deemed acceptable by elected officials. As one scholar has
written:
Among the more important groups of [multiplier] statutes are those
that grant multiplied damages for violation of certain social or
economic rights, and those that aim at consumer protection or regulate
various practices. In the latter category, antitrust statutes are
perhaps the best known but federal multiple damages statutes on
trademarks and patents have also been important. Treble damages
are also allowed under federal and state RICO statutes. The states
often have enacted multiple damages statutes covering timber trespass
and some kinds of forcible entry. Consumer protection statutes also
often provide for multiple damages, and so do many others.99

Multiplied damages may not be truly “punitive” because the
statute absolutely limits the amount of damages a factfinder can
impose and traditional punitive damages have no numerical
limit.100 However, with the United States Supreme Court
essentially mandating a maximum single-digit ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages, and with state legislatures and
Congress enacting caps and other limits on punitive damages,
the argument that multiplied damages are not punitive in
nature has little force. Punitive damages awards in the United
States are always subject to limitations.101 Additionally, the key
to punitive damages is not “how much” is awarded. The key is
whether the amount is not compensatory in nature102 and
98. Jacqueline Perczek, Note, On Efficiency, Deterrence, and Fairness: A
Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 825, 866–67 (1993) (discussing the “valid and compelling state interests” in
having punitive damages, the need to avoid “unbridled jury discretion in assessing
punitive damages,” and the role of courts and legislatures in reaching a
compromise).
99. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 359.
100. Id. (“Multiplied damages statutes are often said to be punitive. This is not
always the whole story, however.”).
101. At the very least, punitive damages awards are constrained by the
reasonableness principles embodied in the Due Process Clause, such as the
requirement that defendants are not subjected to arbitrarily excessive damages.
Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal
Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085, 1146 (2006).
102. Perhaps U.S. punitive damages are becoming more like other jurisdictions’
moral damages. Many European Union countries allow non-compensatory “moral
damages” to redress particularly offensive conduct. See Andrew Spacone, Strict
Liability in the European Union—Not a United States Analogue, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 341, 369 (2000); see also Corongiu, supra note 22, at 60–62 (discussing
Italian danno biologico, danno morale, danno patrimoniale, and danno esistenziale,
which include monetary relief for non-economic injury). If U.S. “punitive damages”
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whether the amount is designed to punish the defendant or
deter similar harmful conduct.103 Because multiplied damages
provide money, in addition to any amounts necessary to
compensate the victim, these multiplied damages qualify as
punitive damages awards.104
II. Cap Statutes

In the mid-1980s, states began placing statutory caps105 on
Many jurisdictions passed
punitive damages awards.106
statutes limiting the recovery of punitive damages as part of a
sweeping nationwide “tort reform.”107 In New Jersey, for
example, a state statute specifies that “[n]o defendant shall be
liable for punitive damages in any action in an amount in excess
of five times the liability of that defendant for compensatory
damages or $350,000, whichever is greater.”108 Virginia caps all
punitive damages awards at $350,000.109 Georgia similarly caps
most punitive damages awards at $250,000.110
Congress has also enacted cap statutes to limit punitive

amount to no more than what other countries—countries that eschew punitive
damages—willingly dole out, there is a very strong argument that U.S. punitive
damages deserve recognition in the European Union. See infra Parts V–VI for more
information.
103. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (“[T]he
consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at
retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”).
104. Multiplied damages, therefore, fall within the meaning of “exemplary or
punitive damages” as used in the Hague Convention. See Hague Convention, supra
note 5, art. 11. Accordingly, these judgments may not be enforced in European
nations that become subject to the Hague Convention. For further discussion, see
infra Part VI.B.
105. Cap statutes work as their name implies, allowing a factfinder to give
punitive damages up to a specified amount. The factfinder may choose to give less
than that specified amount, but may not give more.
106. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 349 (discussing the tort reform movement of the
1980s, in general, and the restrictions placed on punitive damages, in particular).
107. Id. As of 1996, “[a]t least forty of the fifty states have imposed some kind of
restrictions on punitive damages awards, with a majority of these restrictions being
enacted within the past 10 years.” WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 711 n.96.
108. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:15-5.14 (West 2000). For an excellent survey of state
statutes allowing, disallowing, and limiting punitive damages awards, see Corongiu,
supra note 22, at 9–12 (cataloguing and citing various state statutes discussing
availability of punitive damages).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2008) (requiring further that the punitive
damages be deposited into the literary fund established under Article VIII, Section 8
of the Virginia Constitution).
110. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2000).
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damages awards. For example, while the Y2K scare111 was
looming, Congress enacted 15 U.S.C § 6604. This provision
limits punitive damages to the lesser of three times the
compensatory damages or $250,000 in any Y2K action.112
Section 1981a of the Civil Rights Act also caps punitive damages
subject to a sliding scale based on the number of employees who
work for the non-complying employer.113
These laws demonstrate a nationwide movement by elected
lawmaking bodies, at both the federal and state levels, to control
jury discretion and limit punitive damages. Both multiplier
statutes and cap statutes limit the amount of punitive damages
doled out,114 and these statutes evidence the United States’
judicial and political commitment to restricting punitive
damages awards.
The European Union should note this movement and, at the
very least, enforce punitive damages awards in those cases and
from those jurisdictions that have established meaningful
restraints. Nonetheless, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Exxon Shipping, “some legal systems not only decline to
recognize punitive damages themselves but refuse to enforce
foreign punitive judgments as contrary to public policy.”115
The Hague Convention, however, is problematic precisely
because it does not require a Member State to compare the
judgment to be enforced with its internal public policy. The
Hague Convention allows non-enforcement for the simple reason
that the damages are non-compensatory.116 This unfortunate
treaty exists even though, in the United States, both judicial
bodies and legislative bodies at both the federal and state levels
have been decreasing the actions for which punitive damages
are available and limiting the amount of punitive damages
allowable.
111. At the turn of the millennium from 1999 to 2000, many people feared that
there would be widespread computer failure because of the practice of abbreviating a
four-digit year with two digits (e.g., 1982 as 82). See Barnaby J. Feder & Andrew
Pollack, Trillion-Dollar Digits: A Special Report.; Computers and 2000: Race for
Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at A1.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 6604(b)(1) (2006).
113. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D) (2006).
114. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 22, at 349 (discussing caps and multipliers as
statutory limitations on punitive damages); Junping Han, Note, The
Constitutionality of Oregon's Split-Recovery Punitive Damages Statute, 38
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 477, 480 n.8 (2002) (“[L]imitation methods include placing caps
on the amount of punitive damages and setting ratios to compensatory damages.”).
115. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2623 (2008).
116. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
This Article has examined trends in U.S. internal law
impacting punitive damages in civil proceedings based upon
federal and state constitutions, common law principles, and
statutes. These trends set the parameters for awards of
punitive damages in differing types of cases. These trends also
indicate the United States’ willingness to limit juries’ discretion
in awarding punitive damages. The remainder of this Article
explores European Union law and suggests that, when
considering whether to enforce U.S. judgments awarding
punitive damages, Member States should consider (i) the largely
successful efforts of the United States to constrain punitive
damages awards, (ii) Member States’ own increasing use of noncompensatory damages, and (iii) Member States’ willingness to
enforce each other’s non-compensatory awards according to their
treaties unless enforcement violates, or manifestly violates, the
enforcing State’s public policy.
Member States traditionally have shown antagonism
toward imposing or enforcing punitive damages awards,
principally because most did not recognize this remedy in civil
proceedings.117 England is the notable exception: England, the
birthplace of common law punitive damages,118 has had punitive
damages in its internal jurisprudence since the eighteenth
century.119 But while England may be the only Member State
that assesses punitive damages and the only Member State that
readily classifies these non-compensatory damages as
“punitive,” it is not the only Member State whose courts allow
and enforce non-compensatory damage awards.120

117.
118.

Gotanda, supra note 14, at 508–09.
John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 398 (2004) (noting that the “common law tradition of awarding
punitive damages traces its roots to England.”).
119. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) (finding that the “common law authority for
courts to award punitive damages originated in eighteenth-century England . . . .”);
see also Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2623 (“In England and Wales, punitive, or
exemplary, damages are available only for oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional
action by government servants; injuries designed by the defendant to yield a larger
profit than the likely cost of compensatory damages; and conduct for which punitive
damages are expressly authorized by statute.”) (citing Rookes v. Barnard (1964) 1
All E.R. 367, 410–11 (H.L.)).
120. See infra Part III.B.
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A. ENGLAND
“The common law tradition of awarding punitive damages
traces its roots to England.”121 As early as 1763, English courts
were awarding punitive damages in certain cases.122 English
law prohibits excessive punitive damages awards, however, and
punitive damages are generally constrained by a three-to-one
ratio with respect to compensatory damages.123
In the 2001 case of Kuddus v. Chief Constable of
Leicestershire Constabulary,124 the House of Lords expressed its
willingness to expand the purview of punitive damages awards
in England. In Kuddus, the plaintiff alleged that his property
had been stolen and destroyed.125 Although the plaintiff never
withdrew his allegation, the defendant forged the plaintiff’s
signature saying that the complaint had been dropped.126
Accordingly, the investigation into the robbery stopped.127 The
plaintiff alleged misfeasance by a public officer. The lower court
had dismissed a claim for punitive damages on the ground that
misfeasance of office had not traditionally supported punitive
damages awards.128
The House of Lords reinstated the demand for punitive
damages.129 Lord Slynn of Hadley’s opinion noted that the Law
Commission in its Report on Aggravated, Exemplary and

121. Gotanda, supra note 118, at 398; see also Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at
2620 (“The modern Anglo-American doctrine of punitive damages dates back at least
to 1763, when a pair of decisions by the Court of Common Pleas recognized the
availability of damages for more than the injury received.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
122. See Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.) (awarding punitive
damages in a libel case). England’s Supreme Court Act of 1981 provides that juries
may hear a variety of cases. See Supreme Court Act of 1981, 1981, c. 54, § 69 (Eng.)
(providing that juries may hear a variety of cases). That juries may award punitive
damages in England indicates that England, at least, should not refuse to enforce
U.S. punitive damages awards because of the fear of juries as factfinders.
123. See Gotanda, supra note 118, at 442 (“In England, the punitive damages
award in most cases should not exceed three times the basic damages.”). For a
review of England’s experience with punitive damages, see Andrew Tettenborn,
Punitive Damages—A View from England, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1551 (2004).
124. Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] UKHL 29,
[2002] 2 A.C. 122 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
125. Id. ¶ 2.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 3.
129. Id. ¶¶ 27 (L. Slynn of Hadley), 48 (L. Mackay of Clashfern), 68–69 (L.
Nicholls of Birkenhead), 94 (L. Hutton of Foscote), 139 (L. Scott of Foscote).
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Restitutionary Damages130 “recommended that the availability
of punitive damages be extended for most torts”131 and that in
previous cases, the House of Lords refused to eliminate the
availability of punitive damages.132
It is unclear if reported cases discuss whether other
European Union countries have enforced English punitive
damages awards or if any cases set forth what those countries’
reactions to England’s punitive damages jurisprudence have
been.
Because most English judgments presumably are
enforced in England, litigants may have little need to seek
additional enforcement outside its borders. Alternatively, prior
to the Brussels Regulation, the prevailing party in an English
court case rendering punitive damages may have believed
enforcement outside England unlikely, and so did not pursue
the matter or settled on terms more favorable to the defendant
to avoid foreign enforcement proceedings.133 One might also
surmise that other countries simply enforce modest awards—
even awards containing punitive damages elements—without
commenting on having done so, especially considering the
Brussels Regulation’s pronouncement that enforcement among
E.U. countries should be easy to accomplish and should not be
undermined unless awards are “manifestly contrary” to public
policy.134

130. U.K. Law Comm’n, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages,
Law Comm’n Rep. No.247, ¶ 5.49 (1997). This recommendation to increase
England’s use of punitive damages is particularly interesting because it comes at a
time when the United States is restricting its use of punitive damages. Perhaps this
could be a strong bargaining point for the United States, at least with England,
because a country that not only allows punitive damages, but may be on the verge of
expanding its use of punitive damages, should not look too harshly upon a country
that allows punitive damages and is trying to restrict their use. In fact, this may be
a fairly strong bargaining point with all Member States. After all, at least on paper,
they freely enforce each other’s judgments because of the Brussels Regulation. See
infra Part IV.A. So too should they, at least on paper, freely enforce U.S. judgments.
131. Kuddus, ¶ 25 (L. Slynn of Hadley) (citing Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C.
1129 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) and Broome v Cassell & Co., [1972] A.C.
1027 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K)).
132. Id.
133. Of course, that rationale would not prevail after the enactment of the
Brussels Regulation, which makes the enforcement process easier among European
Union countries.
134. Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 34 (“A judgment shall not be
recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member
State in which recognition is sought.”); cf. Lugano Convention, supra note 11, art. 27
(“A judgment shall not be recognised . . . if such recognition is contrary to public
policy in the state in which recognition is sought.”).
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B. OTHER E.U. MEMBER STATES
Although courts in E.U. Member States generally do not
award punitive damages, Professor Gotanda predicted that
“France, Germany, and the European Union may soon be more
receptive to awards of punitive damages.”135 In France, a
proposed revision to the Civil Code explicitly authorizes noncompensatory damages and, in fact, calls them punitive
damages.136
“[G]ermany has historically been steadfastly against any
recognition of punitive damages in civil actions . . . .”137 In fact,
in 1992, Germany’s highest court refused to enforce a punitive
damages judgment from the United States.138 Despite this
apparent hard stance against punitive damages, “German
courts frequently awarded damages that could not seriously be
held to be purely compensatory because they tended to include
punitive elements.”139
Italy too allows some forms of non-compensatory damages,
mostly notably through Section 96 of the Italian Code of Civil
Procedure (CPC).140 Dr. Corongiu finds that “pursuant to
135.
136.

Gotanda, supra note 14, at 516.
The proposed revision states:

One whose fault is manifestly premeditated, particularly a fault whose
purpose is monetary gain, may be ordered to pay punitive damages besides
compensatory damages. The judge may direct a part of such damages to
the public treasury. The judge must provide specific reasons for ordering
such punitive damages and must clearly distinguish their amount from
that of other damages awarded to the victim.
Avant-projet de reforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du Code civil),
et du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil), art. 1371 (Sept. 22,
2005)
available
at
http://www.henricapitant.org/sites/default/files/Avantprojet_de_reforme_du_droit_des_obligations_et_de_la_prescription_et_expose_des_m
otifs.pdf,
translated
in
http://www.henricapitant.org/sites/default/files/
Traduction_definitive_Alain_Levasseur.pdf [hereinafter France Proposal].
Also
found in Gotanda, supra note 14, at 517.
137. Gotanda, supra note 14, at 518.
138. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 4, 1992,
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 118 (312), 1993
(F.R.G), translated in 32 I.L.M. 1320 (1993).
139. Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law—Tendencies
Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
105, 126 (2003); see also Gotanda, supra note 14, at 518–19.
140. Dr. Corongiu translates the pertinent part of Section 96 of the CPC in the
following manner:
Should it result that the losing party has filed a suit or has committed
itself in the proceedings with fraud or culpable negligence, the Judge, upon
request of the prevailing party, condemns the losing party not only to pay
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Section 96 CPC, the Court is free to condemn the losing party to
pay whatever sum it deems appropriate, notwithstanding the
real damage effectively suffered by the prevailing party.”141 To
the extent that Section 96 does not limit damages to payment of
compensation, any excess damages resemble pure punitive
damages similar to those that might be assessed absent
statutory caps or multiplier statutes in the United States.142
Other European Union countries also allow noncompensatory damages in the form of “moral damages.” Moral
damages may include damages for “particularly offensive”
acts.143 U.S. courts have often said that punitive damages
punish bad behavior by defendants, thus the particularly
offensive act requirement seems to coincide with the U.S.
approach.144 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden permit awards of
moral damages for certain offenses.145 France also allows
judgments containing moral damages.146
The European Union as a whole may soon allow punitive
damages awards for breach of antitrust rules. The European
Commission issued a Green Paper, which, among other things,
the legal expenses, but also to pay the prevailing party an amount of
damages, which is liquidated by the Judge in its decision.
Corongiu, supra note 22, at 51–52.
141. Id. at 54; see also id. at 57–58 (noting that “according to the interpretation
of Section 96 CPC given by the Corte di Cassazione, a supplemental damage should
be awarded against a party which has behaved in a negligent or fraudulent way
during a civil proceedings [sic], notwithstanding the Court’s assessment of other
‘compensative’ damages.”).
142. Even though Italy allows some forms of non-compensatory damages, the
Italian courts recently refused to permit a mother to collect her $1 million dollar
reward for her son’s death because the U.S. law regarding punitive damages
offended Italian notions of justice. See Parrot v. Fimez S.P.A., Corte app. Venezia,
15 oct. 2001, n.1359, Guir. It. II 2002, 1021, translated in Lucia Ostoni, Italian
Rejection of Punitive Damages in a U.S. Judgment, 24 J.L. & COM. 245, 251–62
(2005); see also Corongiu, supra note 22, at 3. The Venice Court of Appeal had to
resort to a public policy defense in order to refuse enforcement of this award; how
much easier will it be for the Venice Court of Appeal to reject enforcement of the
next award? If the Hague Convention comes into effect in Italy, the court may
simply point to Article 11, which allows non-recognition if the judgment contains
non-compensatory elements.
143. See Commission Green Paper on Compensation to Crime Victims, at 14–15,
COM (2001) 536 final (Sept. 28, 2001) (explaining that many Member States seek to
make crime victims whole through moral damages).
144. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2620–21, 2628, 2631
(2008); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003);
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
145. Commission Green Paper on Compensation to Crime Victims, supra note
143, at 15.
146. See id.
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calls for allowing double damages in certain antitrust actions.147
This Green Paper may lead to legislation. Professor Gotanda
believes that the proposal, if adopted, would evidence the most
significant change with respect to the European Union’s
attitude toward punitive damages.148
As this section has shown, many E.U. Member States,
which previously prohibited punitive damages and even looked
with suspicion at non-compensatory damages, are now trending
toward permitting some awards with extra-compensatory
aspects.149 As the European Union’s attitude shifts regarding
their own allowance for punitive damages, so too should its
attitude change regarding the enforcement of U.S. judgments
containing punitive damages elements.
IV. E.U. MEMBER STATES LIBERALLY ENFORCE EACH
OTHERS’ JUDGMENTS
A. BRUSSELS REGULATION
The Brussels Regulation150 evidences a liberal policy of
enforcing judgments among E.U. Member States.151 Article 33
requires that “[a] judgment given in a Member State shall be
recognised in the other Member States without any special
procedure being required.”152 Article 36 prohibits any review of
Taken in
the substance of the underlying judgment.153
conjunction, Articles 33 and 36 indicate that neither technical
nor substantive objections will bar the enforcement of Member
States’ judgments in the courts of other Member States.
The Brussels Regulation does not explicitly mention
punitive damages. It does, however, have one important
provision that may be deployed to limit enforcement of punitive
damages awards. Article 34 provides that a judgment “shall not
147. Gotanda, supra note 14, at 520.
148. Id. at 520.
149. See id. at 517–21.
150. Brussels Regulation, supra note 9.
151. Some have likened the liberal enforcement policy among European Union
Member States to the similar liberal enforcement policy among states in the United
States under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Danford, supra note 7, at 390. This
Article will explore that contention later in this section.
See infra text
accompanying notes 162–165.
152. Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 33.
153. Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 36 (“Under no circumstances may a
foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.”).
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be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public
policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.”154
154. Id. art. 34. As stated in the American Law Institute’s Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
The word ‘manifestly’ was added to the original text taken from the
Brussels Convention to emphasize that public policy should only rarely
serve as a justification for refusing recognition or enforcement. The same
approach is taken even by countries not linked by treaty . . . . [P]ublic
policy (or ordre public) is meant to be an escape hatch that should rarely be
used . . . . The fact that the lex fori on the same point differs from the
foreign law is not a sufficient ground for denying recognition to the foreign
claim. Fundamental values must be at stake.
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED
FED. STATUTE § 5 cmt. at 76–77 (Proposed Final Draft 2005) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). The vast majority of United States courts enforce
foreign money judgments pursuant to the UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 89 (Supp. 2000). Notably, there is a “public policy”
exception. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 703 (internal citation omitted). But “courts
have seldom used it.” Id.
Recently, all E.U. Member States (with the exception of Denmark, who was also
not a signatory to the Brussels Regulation), signed the Conflict of Laws, “Rome II”
Regulation, governing non-contractual obligations, and Rome II went into effect in
January 2009. Like the Brussels Regulation, Rome II also provides for liberal
enforcement of judgments among E.U. countries. Of particular importance—and
strongly echoing the Brussels Regulation—Clause 32 of the preamble provides as
follows:
Considerations of public interest justify giving the courts of Member States
the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of applying exceptions based
on public policy and overriding mandatory provisions. In particular, the
application of a provision of a law designated by this Regulation which
would have the effect of causing non-compensatory[,] exemplary[,] or
punitive damages of an excessive nature to be awarded may, depending on
the circumstances of the case and the legal order of the Member States
court seised, be regarded as being contrary to the public policy (ordre
pubic) of the forum.
Rome II Regulation 864/2007, pmbl., cl. 32, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40, 42 (EC) (first,
second, and third emphases added). Rome II specifically mentions punitive
damages, but it should be noted that only in “exceptional circumstances,” where
those punitive damages are “of an excessive nature” may Member States rely on
Rome II to justify refusing to enforce judgments of sister States. Moreover, Rome II
explicitly acknowledges the importance of free enforcement of judgments. Clause 6
of the preamble provides that
The proper functioning of the internal market creates a need, in order to
improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation, certainty as to the
law applicable and the free movement of judgments, for the conflict-of-law
rules in the Member States to designate the same national law irrespective
of the country of the court in which an action is brought.
Id. at pmbl., cl. 6, 40 (emphasis added). The need for the “free movement of
judgments” underscores the need for Member States to enforce each other’s punitive
damages awards, at least in those unexceptional circumstances in which the awards
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The issue relates to whether a particular judgment is
“manifestly contrary” to the public policy of the Member State in
which recognition is sought.
The determination of what constitutes public policy lies at
the heart of Article 34’s imperative. It is no easy question and is
one that has plagued courts.155 Different contexts yield different
considerations and may even require contrary resolutions. The
public policy defense in the European Union typically turns on
each State’s own internal public policy.156 The public policy
defense allows “the enforcing court to deny recognition if a
foreign judgment is . . . repugnant to [the enforcing
jurisdiction’s] laws, morals, or sense of justice.”157 Thus, at least
to the extent the enforcing State itself would allow similar noncompensatory damages, the enforcing State cannot say that the
other State’s punitive damages award is “manifestly contrary”
to the enforcing State’s public policy simply because there is a
non-compensatory component to the award.158 Of course, a

are not so excessive as to violate public policy in the enforcing State.
155. “Some countries have interpreted [the public policy] exception broadly so
that any award violating domestic public policy may be denied recognition and
enforcement.” Gotanda, supra note 14, at 512. In these countries, the law of the
particular country may serve to bar enforcement. Id. Other countries interpret the
exception narrowly, and for these States, only international public policy may serve
to bar recognition. Id. (discussing France) (citing Code de procedure civile [C. Pr.
Civ.] art. 1502 (Fr.), reprinted in 7 Y.B. Com. Arb. 281–82 (1982)); cf. Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) (explaining that, in the
choice of law context for entertaining a sister state’s claim, the public policy defense
would not apply unless upholding the claim “would violate some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal.”). Loucks did not address enforcement of judgments.
In the enforcement of judgments context, “the scope for a public policy exception is
even narrower due to the competing policy in favor of recognition.” RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FED.
STATUTE, supra note 154, § 5 cmt. at 73.
156. See Danford, supra note 7, at 430–31. France, however, reads the public
policy exception narrowly and will only decline to enforce a judgment that runs
contrary to international public policy. Gotanda, supra note 14, at 512 (“Unlike
domestic public policy, which includes all of the imperative rules of the State in
which enforcement is sought, international public policy encompasses only those
basic notions of morality and justice accepted by civilized countries.”).
157. Danford, supra note 7, at 427 (internal citation omitted). By way of
example, in refusing to enforce a $1 million dollar judgment against an Italian
helmet maker, the Italian Supreme Court said that the punitive portion of the
judgment violated its public policy. See Parrot v. Fimez S.P.A., Corte app. Venezia,
15 oct. 2001, n.1359, Guir. It. II 2002, 1021, translated in Ostoni, supra note 142, at
251–62; Liptak, supra note 1.
158. Although this proposition appears uncontroversial, it seems that some
countries “cling . . . to a double standard,” at least in other contexts:
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punitive damages award may be grossly excessive, and on that
account may be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing
State, even if that Member State’s courts would enter a more
modest punitive damages award in similar circumstances.
The public policy defense in the Brussels Regulation allows
non-enforcement only when a foreign judgment is manifestly
contrary to public policy.159 Note the strong language chosen by
the drafters: the judgment must not simply differ from local
policy; it must be blatantly contrary to it.160 This implies that
Member States should generally enforce each other’s judgments
even if those judgments do not neatly fit into the enforcing
State’s internal laws.
The significance of the Brussels Regulation cannot be
overstated: it allows the free flow of judgments among countries
of the European Union. Indeed, one scholar has referred to the
Brussels Regulation as “the single most important private
international law treaty in history.”161 Another author has
opined that the Brussels Regulation has created “an essentially
federal system of recognition of judgments”162 similar to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.163
This analogy to the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
interesting because of the strong presumption of inter-state
enforcement in the United States pursuant to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.164 At least one fundamental difference, however,
The United Kingdom still clings to a double standard for personal
jurisdiction and, absent a treaty, will not recognize foreign default
judgments unless based on nineteenth century bases—service while
present, appearance, or prior consent. Yet, for its own courts, the U.K.
maintains a modern long-arm regime exercising specific jurisdiction in
contract, maintenance, tort, and other matters.
WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 708–09.
159. Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 34. Recall also the Rome II
Regulation, which asks for free enforcement of judgments across the European
Union and only disallows enforcement, even of punitive damages awards, if, in an
“exceptional circumstance,” the award is truly “excessive.” See Rome II Regulation,
supra note 154, at pmbl., cl. 32, at 42.
160. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 34.
161. Friedrick K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 111, 116 (1998).
162. Danford, supra note 7, at 390.
163. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.”); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
164. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 492 (2003) (explaining that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause mandates interstate respect for final judgments so
long as they are rendered by a court with personal and subject matter jurisdiction).
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distinguishes the Full Faith and Credit Clause from Article 34
of the Brussels Regulation. In the United States, the enforcing
state may not rely on public policy to refuse the enforcement of a
sister state judgment.165 The more restrictive the reading of
Article 34 of the Brussels Regulation and its “manifestly
contrary to public policy” requirement, the more closely the
Brussels Regulation parallels the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and the more likely the Member States will feel obligated to
enforce each other’s judgments.
B. LUGANO CONVENTION
The Lugano Convention166 is an agreement among the
members of the EFTA that is, in large part, identical to the
Brussels Regulation with respect to the enforcement of
judgments containing punitive damages.
The Lugano
Convention “is intended to ensure the free movement of
judgments.”167 Thus, the Lugano Convention extends to nonEuropean Union EFTA states—such as Iceland, Norway, and
Switzerland—similar rights and duties with respect to the
enforcement of judgments that the Brussels Regulation extends
165. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress has the authority to
regulate the effect of sister state acts, records, and proceedings. State courts do not
have that same authority absent congressional legislation. See Baker v. General
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“A final judgment in one State, if rendered
by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed
by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land. For claim and issue
preclusion (res judicata) purposes, in other words, the judgment of the rendering
State gains nationwide force.”). The Supreme Court clearly precluded any “roving
‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and credit due judgments.” Id. There may
be isolated exceptions to the notion that U.S. states give full faith and credit to sister
courts’ adjudications—such as the fact that some state courts threatened not to
honor gay marriages performed in other states—but marriages are not traditional
civil judgments. Moreover, Congress has enacted the Defense of Marriage Act,
which exempts gay marriage from the traditional full faith and credit enforcement
mechanism:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian Tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). This one exception regarding inter-state enforcement of a
civil act helps prove the rule that, generally, inter-state enforcement of judgments is
taken for granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
166. Lugano Convention, supra note 11.
167. Danford, supra note 7, at 397.
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to signatory E.U. Member States.
In language paralleling that of Article 33 of the Brussels
Regulation, Article 26 of the Lugano Convention provides, “A
judgment given in a Contracting State shall be recognized in the
other Contracting States without any special procedure being
required.”168 Like Article 36 of the Brussels Regulation, Article
29 of the Lugano Convention does not allow the enforcing State
to review the foreign judgment as to its substance.169 Finally,
and most importantly for purposes of this Article, in a provision
almost mirroring Article 34 of the Brussels Regulation, Article
27 of the Lugano Convention provides, inter alia, that a
“judgment shall not be recognized if such recognition is contrary
to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought.”170
Note, however, that enforcement must be declined if the
judgment is contrary—not manifestly contrary—to public
policy.171 Because the provisions of the Brussels Regulation and
the Lugano Convention are nearly identical,172 EFTA states,
like E.U. Member States, must liberally enforce punitive
damages awards among contracting states.

168. Lugano Convention, supra note 11, art. 26.
169. Id. art. 29.
170. Id. art. 27.
171. For a draft version of the updated Lugano Convention, see Lugano
Convention 2007, Oct. 30, 2007, available at http://www.ofj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/
data/wirtschaft/ipr.Par.0022.File.tmp/260307_entw_lugano_convention-e.pdf. Some
format and placement changes are proposed for the articles, but the substance
remains similar. Article 26 will be moved to Article 33. “A judgment given in a
State bound by this Convention shall be recognised in the other States bound by this
Convention without any special procedure being required.” The language of Article
29 remains unchanged, but will move to Article 36. Finally, Article 27 will become
Article 34 and will use the “manifestly contrary” language of the Brussels
Regulation. The Lugano Convention will provide: “A judgment shall not be
recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the State in
which recognition is sought.” The switch from “contrary” to “manifestly contrary” is
interesting because it shows that European countries recognize the especially high
bar to non-recognition created by the “manifestly contrary” language.
172. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 34 (providing that “A judgment
shall not be recognised: 1. if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy
in the Member State in which recognition is sought”); Lugano Convention, supra
note 11, art. 27 (providing that “A judgment shall not be recognized: 1. if such
recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought”).
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V. MULTI-NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
A. THREE HYPOTHETICALS
To put the punitive damages issue in perspective, consider
the following three examples in which a U.S. court has entered a
judgment, which includes punitive damages, against an E.U.
corporation. For these hypotheticals, assume that the Hague
Convention is in effect in both the United States and E.U.
Member States. Suppose further that the E.U. corporation
lacks sufficient assets in the United States to satisfy the
judgment, and the U.S. judgment-creditor must enforce the
judgment in an E.U. Member State. The corporation resists
enforcement based on Article 11 of the Hague Convention,
which allows non-recognition of a foreign judgment if the
judgment awards exemplary or punitive damages.173 In each
hypothetical, consider whether the identity of the factfinder,
judge, or jury, is or should be relevant to the enforcing
country.174
(1)
A judgment against the E.U. corporation grants
compensatory damages, which a judge doubles pursuant to the
applicable multiplier statute. The excess damages are labeled
“punitive damages.”175
(2) A judgment against the same E.U. corporation is based
173.

Article 11 provides as follows:

1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the
extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or
punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm
suffered. 2. The court addressed shall take into account whether and to
what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover
costs and expenses relating to the proceedings.
Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
174. It has been stated that the true reason underlying the European attitude
against enforcement of American punitive damages awards lies in the European
Union’s distrust of the U.S. jury system. For example, Lord Denning stated that
U.S. juries award damages in “fabulous” amounts. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd.
v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 734 (C.A. 1982) (L. Denning M.R.). U.S. juries,
however, cannot award punitive damages in “fabulous” amounts when they are
constrained by statutes, case law, and constitutional principles.
175. Would there be any difference where the additional damages are designed
to cover costs, expenses, and perhaps other intangibles? The Hague Convention
indicates that the answer to that question is “yes.” Article 11 states that the
enforcing court “shall take into account whether and to what extent the damages
awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the
proceedings.” Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
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on the Civil Rights Act of 1991.176 The statute contains a sliding
scale cap on punitive damages whereby the amount of punitive
damages is related to the size of the employer (i.e., the
defendant). The judge in charge of the case consults the statute
to determine the appropriate limit for punitive damages.177
(3) A judgment against the same E.U. corporation based on
product liability principles. The jury finds that the defendant
attempted to conceal its wrongdoing and engaged in cover-ups
including the destruction of incriminating evidence. In addition
to compensatory damages, the jury awards pure punitive
damages, unrestrained by any statute.178
In reality, it is not the identity of the fact finder that
The enforcement of non-compensatory
matters most.179
damages in general and punitive damages in particular rests, in
part, on the type and amount of punitive damages. It logically
follows that the more constrained the damages, either by statute
or by judicial pronouncement, the more likely that Member
States will enforce such damages for each other and the more
likely that they will enforce them when they appear in
judgments rendered by courts of the United States.
176. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
177. The sum of the amount of punitive damages awarded in cases of intentional
discrimination in employment:
Shall not exceed, for each complaining party—(A) in the case of a
respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
$50,000; (B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer
than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $100,000; and (C) in the case of a respondent who
has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,
$300,000.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)–(D).
178. Although pure punitive damages are unconstrained by statute, they are not
“pure”—that is, untouched by any constraints at all—because even pure punitive
damages are subject to the reasonableness principles espoused by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); see also supra note 22. Under
such cases as State Farm, the punitive damages are likely to be no more than nine
times greater than the compensatory damages. Id.
179. Of course, the identity of the fact finder does matter for issues of
institutional competence. The jury lacks the ability to compare the award it is about
to hand down against other awards to ensure similarity of punishment for similar
behavior. The jury is also largely unaccountable for its actions and will not feel the
sting of a reversal by a higher court.
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If Member States find punitive damages simply distasteful,
then the U.S. judgment-creditor in each of the hypotheticals will
be unable to enforce any of these judgments in the European
Union. Once in effect, the Hague Convention will seal this
result because it allows E.U. Member States to refuse to enforce
judgments that contain elements “that do not compensate a
party for actual loss or harm suffered.”180 Presumably, under
such a standard, Member States may refuse to enforce even
punitive damages that are not contrary to the enforcing State’s
public policy.
If, however, European countries most fear untrammeled
jury discretion, then a Member State may be far more likely to
enforce punitive damages in hypotheticals (1) or (2) because the
punitive elements of those awards are constrained by statutes:
by a multiplier statute in hypothetical (1) and a cap statute in
hypothetical (2).
In practice, hypothetical (1) likely poses the fewest
enforcement problems because the punitive damages awarded
are constrained by the statute to a one-to-one ratio with respect
to compensatory damages. England itself generally allows noncompensatory damages of up to a three-to-one ratio.181 Thus,
this award presumably would be enforced by at least England,
unless England applies a double-standard of permitting punitive
damages in its own jurisprudence while simultaneously denying
the enforcement of another country’s punitive damages
award.182
If the award doled out in hypothetical (1) had been entered
by an English court originally—rather than by a court in the
United States—the judgment would likely be enforced by other
Member States and EFTA states based on the liberal
enforcement policy of Article 33 of the Brussels Regulation and
Article 26 of the Lugano Convention. Under either treaty, a

180. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
181. Gotanda, supra note 118, at 442 (“In England, the punitive damages award
in most cases should not exceed three times the basic damages.”).
182. England may succumb to just such a double-standard: “The United
Kingdom has gone so far as to pass a ‘claw-back’ statute that not only refuses to
recognize foreign judgments for punitive and multiple damages, but also authorizes
suits to recover any amount of the judgment already paid that was not purely
compensatory.” WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 710; see Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 6 (U.K.) (claw-back statute of the United Kingdom). The
existence of the claw-back statute heightens the need for a revision to the Hague
Convention so that England cannot treat its judgment-creditors more favorably than
those haling from the United States. See infra Parts V–VIII.
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two-to-one punitive-to-compensatory ratio found in the
hypothetical appears reasonable and therefore should not be
contrary—or manifestly contrary—to public policy.183
Under the Hague Convention, however, E.U. countries
other than England184 may legitimately decline to enforce this
judgment if it issued from a U.S. court.185 To sidestep this
result, the clever U.S. judgment-creditor could domesticate the
judgment in England and employ the Brussels Regulation or
Lugano Convention to enforce the “English” judgment in
another country.
Hypothetical (2) may be more problematic for the U.S.
judgment-creditor, even though the judge is constrained by
statute, because the cap on punitive damages is tied to the
corporation’s size, not the extent of its misconduct. A larger but
less culpable corporation could be subjected to a higher punitive
damages judgment than would a smaller but more culpable
corporation. Such an award, with only limited connection to a
corporation’s blameworthiness, could run afoul of a foreign
nation’s public policy.186 After all, punitive damages punish;
they should punish the worst behavior, not the deepest pockets.
Accordingly, E.U. countries could legitimately resist
enforcement even among other signatories of the Brussels
Regulation and the Lugano Convention.187 So much the worse
for a judgment-creditor contending with Article 11 of the Hague
Convention, which allows non-recognition simply because the
damages are punitive, not compensatory.
Of the posited hypotheticals, case (3) creates the potential
for the type of enormous punitive damages awards that E.U.
Member States most fear and are most inclined to refuse to
enforce. In hypothetical (3), the jury is free to impose whatever
amount of punitive damages it deems appropriate, subject only
183. A two-to-one punitive-to-compensatory ratio is not the “fabulous” amount
that Member States claim to fear. Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1
W.L.R. 730, 734 (C.A. 1982) (L. Denning, M.R.).
184. Absent a double-standard, England should enforce an out-of-country
judgment that contains punitive damages that England’s courts would themselves
allow. Of course, the language of the Hague Convention is lenient to the enforcing
State, so England could refuse to enforce a U.S. judgment that included punitive
damages simply because the judgment included punitive damages. The plain
language of the Hague Convention allows for such an incongruous result. See Hague
Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
185. Id.
186. What runs afoul of “public policy” is discussed supra Part IV.A–B.
187. See Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 34; see also Lugano Convention,
supra note 11, art. 27.
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to due process principles. Therefore, the pure punitive damages
envisioned in hypothetical (3) are the least likely to be enforced
by an E.U. Member State.
B. U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENTS MERIT ENFORCEMENT
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Although an E.U. Member State is unlikely to enforce the
punitive damages award in a situation similar to hypothetical
(3), these damages should be enforced by E.U. Member States,
as is clear with some revisions to the hypothetical. Assume the
punitive damages award is rendered in France, with its newfound tolerance toward punitive damages,188 rather than in the
United States. Assume further that the damages are awarded
in a ratio less than or equal to the three-to-one punitive-tocompensatory ratio tolerated in England. As long as an English
court would have allowed punitive damages in a similar case,
England should presumptively enforce the French judgment
because it is “not manifestly contrary” to English public policy.
Of course, the French court could have given more punitive
damages than the three-to-one ratio. France is not bound by
England’s jurisprudence. Even assuming the French court
doled out punitive damages in a ratio higher than three-to-one
with respect to compensatory damages, such a judgment still
should not “manifestly” violate the public policy of England.
The award may exceed the English cap, but the concept of
punitive damages is not foreign to England and certainly not
manifestly so. For example, it is difficult to argue that while
$100,000 in punitive damages comports with public policy,
$150,000 “manifestly” does not. Thus, England should enforce
the French judgment, even if the judgment is higher than that
which English courts would normally tolerate.189
If the enforcing English court does decide that the French
judgment is “manifestly contrary” to English public policy, it
would have three options: first, discard the “excess” portion of
the punitive damages judgment and enforce the remainder,
including that portion of the punitive damages that England
does not consider excessive; second, throw out the punitive
damages portion of the award; or third, refuse to enforce the
188. See France Proposal, supra note 136.
189. Perhaps only those Member States that completely eschew all forms of noncompensatory damages could logically claim that punitive damages per se violate
public policy.
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judgment in its entirety. The most sensible response seems to
be the first,190 although it raises the question: how much is the
“excess” that manifestly violates England’s public policy?191
Assume as a further revision to hypothetical (3) that the
English court grants punitive damages. The plaintiff seeks
enforcement in Germany, which does not permit punitive
damages and has found punitive damages violative of its public
policy.192 Germany could rely on Article 34 of the Brussels
Regulation to resist enforcement of the punitive damages aspect
of the English award. But even this may be improper for two
reasons.
First, Article 34 is a safety valve to block awards manifestly
contrary to the Member States’ laws, morals, or sense of justice.
Member States generally make “sparing use of the public-policy
exception.”193
Second, at the time Germany signed the Brussels
Regulation, all Member States presumably knew that English
law permitted punitive damages. As noted previously, Articles
33 and 36 require enforcement of foreign judgments without
regard to procedural niceties or substantive review.194 Article
34 seems to be the only provision in the Brussels Regulation
that might block the enforcement of punitive damages awards
through the exercise of its public policy exception. But that
provision does not specifically address punitive damages awards
and, moreover, does not require the resistance of such damages.
It merely authorizes the Member States’ courts to resist
enforcement of truly outlier judgments. A punitive damages
judgment in a limited amount does not seem to be such an
outlier judgment. It is therefore unlikely that enforcing such
190. Indeed, as will be discussed in Part VI.B, infra, the Hague Convention
allows countries to refuse the enforcement of a judgment “if, and to the extent that,
the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do
not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered.” Hague Convention, supra
note 5, art. 11. This bolsters the intuition that the most reasonable reaction to an
excessive damage award is not to disavow the award in its entirety, but instead to
cull down that award “to the extent” that it violates the enforcing State’s notions of
fairness.
191. Obviously, punitive damages in amounts greater than three-to-one are
more than English courts would ordinarily permit, but does that mean that anything
in excess of three-to-one violates public policy? Manifestly so?
192. Danford, supra note 7, at 430. But see Behr, supra note 139, at 160 (finding
that Germany does allow some non-compensatory damages in civil cases); Liptak,
supra note 1.
193. Danford, supra note 7, at 430.
194. See supra Part IV.A.
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damages would be manifestly contrary to Germany’s public
policy.
After all, Germany willingly signed the Brussels
Regulation despite the fact that, at the time of its enactment, at
least England tolerated punitive damages judgments.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then it stands to reason
that if that same constrained judgment were awarded by a U.S.
court instead of an English court, Germany should enforce the
punitive damages judgment. After all, the punitive damages
should not offend Germany’s public policy more deeply simply
because they were granted by a U.S. court and not an E.U.
Member State’s court.
Nonetheless, E.U. Member States seem to harbor grave
misgivings about U.S. punitive damages awards and, because of
the Hague Convention’s grudging attitude toward punitive
damages, the German court in this fact pattern is probably less
likely to enforce the punitive damages judgment coming from a
U.S. court than from an English court. Certainly, it would be
easier for Germany to justify non-enforcement under the Hague
Convention than it would be for Germany to do so under the
“manifestly contrary” clause of the Brussels Regulation.195 This
result strikes a foul chord because U.S. judgments deserve to be
treated with the same respect as do judgments from courts of
E.U. Member States.

VI. THE ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDS
A. BEFORE THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Enforcement of U.S. punitive damages awards varied in
E.U. Member States before 2005, the date of the Hague
Convention.196 Member States sometimes used “public policy” to
decline enforcement.197
195. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 6. In an increasingly global market,
courts should strive to treat judgment-creditors similarly. It is simply an accident of
geography that a judgment-creditor hales from the United States, not England, or
an accident of finances that the defendant lacks sufficient assets in the United
States to cover the entire judgment. Such fortuity seems unfair given that a U.S.
court has determined that the judgment-creditor is entitled to, and that the
defendant deserves to be punished by, punitive damages.
196. Of course, the Hague Convention is not yet in effect in any country in the
European Union or in the United States. See supra note 5.
197. Id. art. 9. This suggests that even if the Hague Convention had similar
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In two highly publicized cases, both Germany and Italy
relied on public policy to deny the enforcement of punitive
damages judgments emanating from U.S. courts. In 1992, the
German Bundesgerichtshof198 held that enforcement of an
award of punitive damages would violate German public
policy.199 In 2002, the Venice Court of Appeal held that a $1
million punitive damages judgment contravened Italian public
policy.200
Germany, however, has retreated from its earlier position
against enforcement of punitive damages awards.201 In a later
case, the German Supreme Court held that damages for privacy
right violations may be awarded in an amount that would deter
Accordingly, Germany may
repetition of the conduct.202
authorize the enforcement of punitive damages awards, as long
as that judgment does not go “substantially beyond that which
is required for appropriate compensation for the injured
person.”203
Prior to the Hague Convention, other E.U. and EFTA
countries enforced U.S. punitive damages judgments,
determining that the awards did not violate their public policy.
A Spanish court, for example, enforced a U.S. treble damages
award, even though Spain is a civil law country that does not
authorize awards of punitive damages.204 The court analogized
language to the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention, Member States might
still refuse to enforce U.S. punitive damages awards. If this is so—that is, if the
liberal enforcement language of the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention
would have the effect of blocking the enforcement of American punitive damages
awards—it seems odd that the drafters of the Hague Convention chose the heavyhanded language employed in Article 11.
198. The Bundesgerichtshof is the highest appeals court in Germany for civil
and
criminal
matters.
Federal
Court
of
Justice
of
Germany,
http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Federal-Court-of-Justice-of-Germany (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009).
199. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 4, 1992,
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 118 (312), 1993
(F.R.G), translated in 32 I.L.M. 1320 (1993); see also Ronald A. Brand, Punitive
Damages Revisited: Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments
Too Far, 24 J.L. & COM. 181, 185 (2005) (holding that punitive damages are “a
function of criminal proceedings in the German legal system”).
200. See Parrot v. Fimez S.P.A., Corte app. Venezia, 15 oct. 2001, n.1359, Guir.
It. II 2002, 1021, translated in Ostoni, supra note 142, at 251–62.
201. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 709.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 710.
204. Scott R. Jablonski, Translation and Comment: Enforcing U.S. Punitive
Damages Awards in Foreign Courts. A Recent Case in the Supreme Court of Spain,
24 J.L. & COM. 225, 231–43 (2005). While discussing the Spanish case, Professor
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the punitive aspect of the damages to Spain’s moral damages.205
Switzerland, a member of the EFTA, enforced a California
punitive damages judgment even though Swiss law does not
authorize punitive damages awards.206 France reads the public
policy exception narrowly and will only decline enforcement of a
judgment if the judgment runs contrary to international public
policy.207
The foregoing indicates that punitive damages did not need
to be available in the enforcing European jurisdiction for that
country to enforce U.S. punitive damages awards. These courts
took seriously the notion that damages awards, even if high and
imposed to punish a bad actor rather than to compensate a
victim, did not necessarily violate local public policy.208
Before 2005, U.S. litigants had met with some hostility with
regard to enforcement of punitive damages awards in European
Union and EFTA States. But U.S. litigants also met with some
success. Accordingly, scholars cautioned that the United States
should enter into a multi-lateral treaty with other countries to
secure enforcement of such awards.209 The United States did
Gotanda notes that the court “took notice of the fact that U.S. courts have adopted
the principle of ‘proportionality’ in awarding punitive damages, and here the treble
damages award corresponded to ‘the material injuries effectively caused’ and was
part of the ‘legal norm.’” Gotanda, supra note 14, at 522 (citing Miller Import Corp.
v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L., STS, Nov. 13, 2001 (Exequátur, No. 2039/1999) (Spain)).
205. Jablonski, supra note 204, at 242.
206. Brand, supra note 199, at 191. Of course, there are U.S. enforcement cases
outside of Europe, and Brand surveys such cases in his article. He discovers that a
Japanese court refused to enforce an award of punitive damages, while a Canadian
court did enforce punitive damages. Id. Given the recent toy, baby formula, and dog
food scares coming out of China, it seems that major tort cases might proceed
against Chinese defendants. See Gardiner Harris, The Safety Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2008, at MM46. If punitive damages are handed down by U.S. court pursuant to
U.S. punitive damages jurisprudence—a choice of law question beyond the scope of
this Article—it is possible that enforcement proceedings will need to commence in
China. Similar enforcement problems that the United States currently encounters
in the European Union may b encountered in Pacific Rim countries.
207. Gotanda, supra note 14, at 512.
208. If this is so, the more restrictive language of the Hague Convention does
have force, and that language will likely restrict such liberal enforcement in the
future. The Hague Convention specifically allows an E.U. Member State to decline
to enforce a judgment that contains punitive damages simply because the judgment
contains punitive damages. See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
209. See generally Danford, supra note 7, at 398. Danford explains that:
because the United States is not a party to any judgment-enforcement
treaty, whenever a U.S. judgment is taken abroad for enforcement, it is
subject to local laws that sometimes require the institution of a new action
on the merits of the case in the forum in which enforcement is sought. It is
thus clear that U.S. judgments receive less favorable treatment in Europe
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enter into an agreement in June 2005. However, the Hague
Convention did not turn out to be a panacea for those seeking to
enforce U.S. punitive damages judgments in E.U. Member
States.
B. AFTER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention may make the enforcement
situation worse for U.S. judgment-creditors.210 Unlike the
Brussels Regulation and the Lugano Convention, the Hague
Convention not only mentions punitive damages, but it also
explicitly allows countries to refuse to enforce them.211 Article
11 provides as follows:
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or
punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or
harm suffered.
2. The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what
extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs
and expenses relating to the proceedings.212

than do judgments emanating from courts of Brussels Member States.
According to one commentator, many academics across the country, as well
as the U.S. State Department, believe this to be so.
Id. Should a new action be commenced, the distinct possibility exists that the
enforcing court will find the U.S. judgment deficient in one or more respects. One
can only wonder whether the U.S. judgment remains enforceable in the United
States if the United States accepts the doctrine of issue preclusion with respect to
foreign courts. Therefore, Ballard, supra note 21, at 237–38, argued that a
reciprocity requirement would be “a major step forward” for the United States.
Reciprocity in enforcement, however, assumes that both countries authorize similar
types of damages in their judgments—and so would have to enforce the similar
judgment from the other country. If the E.U. country does not hand down
judgments with non-compensatory damages, then there can never be complete
parity of enforcement between that country and the United States. Either that
country will wind up enforcing the U.S. judgment (without the United States being
required to do the same for the E.U. country), or that country will decline to enforce
the U.S. judgment (because the United States does not have to enforce similar
judgments from that country). Neither result is truly reciprocal.
210. See Note & Comment, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements: Creating an International Framework for Recognizing Foreign
Judgments, 3 BYU INT’L L. AND MGMT. REV. 43, 65 n.112 (2006) (noting that the
Hague Convention excludes the United States’ use of punitive damages from
recognition).
211. See Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
212. Id. The Hague Convention perhaps poses even greater problems if the
word “actual” is narrowly construed. For example, future medical expenses may not
be “actual loss or harm suffered” because by their very nature, they are potential
loss or harm that may be suffered in the future. And how would a foreign court
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By their very nature, punitive damages do not compensate
a party for actual loss or harm suffered. Enforcement of
punitive damages judgments may therefore be refused,
notwithstanding whether the enforcing State could have handed
down a similar judgment.213 While courts of Member States
liberally enforce judgments of other Member States’ courts
through the Brussels Regulation and extend liberal enforcement
to EFTA courts’ judgments through the Lugano Convention,
judgments from U.S. courts do not receive similarly favorable
treatment. Under Article 11 of the Hague Convention, England
could decline to enforce a U.S. punitive damages award, even if
English courts would have permitted punitive damages in the
same case. If England, which clearly recognizes punitive
damages and labels them as such, may refuse to enforce U.S.
punitive damages awards under the Hague Convention, so too
may France,214 Germany,215 and Italy,216 which are only
beginning to recognize non-compensatory damages, and so too
may other Member States, which do not authorize punitive
damages in their internal jurisprudence.
VII. PROPOSAL
The United States should not have acceded to such
unfavorable language in the Hague Convention, and it is
unclear why it did so. The Article 11 language may have
resulted from misunderstandings on both sides.
The United States did not seem to fully grasp that some
European countries do recognize punitive damages, although
they may be called by other names, such as “moral damages” or
“danno biologico.”217 Nor did the United States appear to
characterize an award of liquidated damages in a contract action?
213. A real question in these cases relates to the definition of exemplary and
punitive damages. If capped and multiplier awards are not considered punitive
within the meaning of U.S. law, do they nevertheless fall within the ban of Article 11
because they do not “compensate . . . for actual loss or harm suffered”? The answer
seems to be “yes.” Words may, and often do, have different meanings in different
contexts.
214. France is only considering authorizing punitive damages in its Civil Code.
See France Proposal, supra note 136.
215. Germany may have relaxed its stance against punitive damages. See supra
text accompanying notes 135–139.
216. Dr. Corongiu has suggested that Italy has punitive damages in its CPC.
See supra text accompanying notes 140–142.
217. See Corongiu, supra note 22, at 60–61; supra text accompanying notes 143–
146.
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recognize the importance of the fact that European countries
permit liberal enforcement among themselves, even of
judgments containing non-compensatory damages. Recall that
the Member States of the European Union enacted the Brussels
Regulation, whose default position requires enforcement, unless
the judgment is “manifestly contrary” to the enforcing State’s
public policy.
The Member States extended this liberal
enforcement policy to the members of the EFTA in the Lugano
Convention, which only allows non-enforcement if the judgment
is “contrary” to public policy. “Manifestly contrary”—even
“contrary”—creates a high bar. Thus, judgments, even those
containing non-compensatory damages, are likely to be enforced
under the Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention,
especially considering that more and more Member States are
incorporating non-compensatory, or punitive-like, damages into
their laws. Even the Conflict of Laws, “Rome II” Regulation
among the E.U. Member States requires enforcement of
punitive damages awards unless the award is unusually
excessive; otherwise, Article 6 of Rome II requires the “free
movement of judgments.”218
On the other side of the negotiating table, the European
Union did not give the United States enough credit for its
restrictions of punitive damages through both court
pronouncements and legislative acts.219 Indeed, during a time
when many European countries are expanding their use of noncompensatory damages, the United States is attempting to curb
its punitive damages awards. Both ends appear to be moving
toward the middle. Thus, it seems unfair for the European
Union to liberally enforce judgments among its Member States
and EFTA Member States while meagerly enforcing punitive
damages judgments from the United States.
Perhaps the European Union noted these U.S. trends, but
simply decided it did not need to grant more liberal enforcement
of U.S. punitive damages awards. Professor Weintraub has
noted that, despite the United States’ attempt to rein in
218. Rome II, supra note 154, pmbl. cls. 6.
219. “[T]here are signs that the gap between the United States and the rest of
the world is narrowing, as American courts and legislatures start to limit punitive
awards and other countries start to experiment with them.” Liptak, supra note 1.
One may also wonder, in today’s economic market, whether E.U. countries might
impose punitive damages on foreign companies that cause immense injuries through
outrageous conduct to their people. Would it thwart an E.U. country’s public policy
to enforce a punitive damages award if the beneficiaries of the punitive damages
were citizens of the European Union and the defendants were U.S. corporations?
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punitive damages awards other countries may still be reluctant
to enforce these awards.220 Professor Weintraub’s statement is
the very reason that the United States should seek an
amendment to the Hague Convention—so that other nations,
particularly the powerful Member States of the European
Union, cannot simply ignore the trends in the United States and
continue to rely on the outdated fears of excessive and
unrestrained jury verdicts or of punitive damages in general.
Another potential reason for the devastating Article 11
language is that the European Union had little to gain by
allowing enforcement of U.S. punitive damages judgments.
After all, the United States has been enforcing E.U. money
judgments for years.221 Member States thus had little reason to
offer more liberal enforcement to U.S. litigants. Indeed, that is
why, before the Hague Convention, the American Law Institute
was drafting a federal statute that would have required
reciprocal enforcement in other countries before the United
States would enforce similar judgments from those countries
within U.S. borders.222
Because the European Union decided not to grant liberal
enforcement to U.S. punitive damages awards, while
simultaneously granting liberal enforcement to Member States’
punitive damages and non-compensatory damages judgments,
the United States has strong equitable grounds from which to
request amendments to the Hague Convention. The United
States should note its internal trends to constrain punitive
damages and the European Union’s trends toward awarding
and enforcing non-compensatory damages judgments. Based on
these concurrent movements, the United States should use its
220. Professor Weintraub recognized this conundrum when he stated that
“[d]efense of punitive damages will not be helped by the facts that most states have,
by statute or decision, placed limits on punitive awards and that the United States
Supreme Court has held that a ‘grossly excessive’ award of punitive damages
violates due process.” WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 711 (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
221. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), as referenced in Danford,
supra note 7, at 386 (“[M]ost U.S. jurisdictions readily recognize and enforce the
judgments of other nations.”). However, now that Member States are beginning to
authorize non-compensatory damages, it is possible that the United States may
begin to decline to enforce Member States’ judgments.
222. See generally RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FED. STATUTE, supra note 154, § 7(a) (“A foreign judgment
shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the United States if the court finds
that comparable judgments of courts in the United States would not be recognized or
enforced in the courts of the state or origin.”).
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influence to seek an amendment of Article 11 of the Hague
Convention.
At a minimum, the United States should ask to substitute
the draft language of Article 11 of the 1999 Hague Convention.
This draft language provides U.S. litigants a better chance of
having their punitive damages awards enforced in the European
Union by requiring other countries to enforce American punitive
damages to the extent that punitive damages or other noncompensatory damages would be allowed in the enforcing
jurisdiction.223 The draft language provides: “In so far as a
judgment awards non-compensatory, including exemplary or
punitive, damages, it shall be recognised at least to the extent
that similar or comparable damages could have been awarded in
the State addressed.”224
This draft language is preferable to the currently enacted
draft language for the U.S. judgment-creditor seeking
enforcement in an E.U. Member State for at least two reasons.
First, the default requires the recognition of punitive damages
awards: the judgments “shall be recognised.” To the contrary,
the default in the currently enacted language is “refusal” to
enforce.225 Second, even if the enforcement of punitive damages
is not presumed under the “shall be recognized” language of the
1999 draft of the Hague Convention, England and other
jurisdictions recognizing punitive damages, moral damages, and
other non-compensatory damages may nonetheless be required
to honor U.S. punitive damages judgments at least to the extent
the non-compensatory damages might have been awarded in the
enforcing jurisdiction.226 The “at least” language also proves
helpful to U.S. judgment-creditors because it allows E.U.
Member States to enforce an award that is greater than an
award that would have been doled out by the Member States’
own courts. The draft language accordingly stands in marked

223. Of course, the draft language of Article 11 would embrace the reciprocity
principle so that U.S. courts would have to enforce E.U. judgments that contained
non-compensatory damages to the extent that similar damages could have been
awarded in the U.S. court. Hague Convention Draft Language art. 33, Oct. 30, 1999,
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/jdgm_drafte.pdf.
224. Id.
225. Gotanda, supra note 14, at 527 (referring to the current provision as a
“[c]loud on the [h]orizon” for the enforcement of U.S. punitive damages awards
abroad).
226. See, e.g., Corongiu, supra note 22, at 60–61 (cataloguing different types of
Italian damages, including the danno biologico, danno morale, danno patrimoniale,
and danno esistenziale); France Proposal, supra note 136.

DO NOT DELETE

11/19/2009 1:14 PM

2010] ENFORCING U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE E.U.

103

contrast to the current language of Article 11, which allows
refusal simply because the award does not compensate a party
for actual loss or harm suffered.227
Even under the 1999 draft language, however, U.S.
judgments granting punitive damages may not fare well. Under
that language, a Member State need not enforce a punitive
damages award if the enforcing State does not have a
comparable substantive law allowing punitive damages in a
particular type of case.228 Moreover, E.U. Member States could
still retreat to their public policy exceptions, finding the
judgment manifestly violative of their jurisprudence.229 In fact,
Professor Ronald Brand notes that this draft language “may, as
a practical matter, be little more than another way of
approaching the traditional public policy defense to recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments”230 because if the
enforcing State does not recognize similar damages, the draft
language would permit non-enforcement of the judgment on
public policy grounds.
While Professor Brand has a point, surely the 1999 draft
language was more likely to lead to enforcement of U.S. punitive
damages awards than is the current language, which (on its
face) allows non-enforcement even if the enforcing State’s law
allows non-compensatory or punitive damages. Under the draft
language, for example, a European country that awards noncompensatory damages for particular violations would find it

227. Hague Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
228. See Hague Convention Draft Language, supra note 223, art. 25. For
example, assume that a U.S. jury awards punitive damages in connection with a
Title VII claim. Enforcement is then sought in England. If England does not permit
punitive damages in employment discrimination cases, under the draft language,
English courts would not have to enforce the U.S. punitive damages judgment
because “similar or comparable damages” could not have been awarded in England.
The court, however, would have the discretion to enforce the judgment, and the
default would be to enforce, not to refuse enforcement.
229. Of course, we can imagine a more restrictive provision to the effect that “in
so far as a judgment awards non-compensatory, including exemplary or punitive,
damages, it shall be recognised only to the extent that similar or comparable
damages could have been awarded in the State addressed.” That would clearly
render the punitive damages award in the Title VII case non-enforceable if there
were no comparable non-compensatory damages allowed in the enforcing State. At
least the present Hague Convention does allow the enforcing State to enforce the
punitive damages judgment even if that State would not have provided noncompensatory damages in that case or a similar case. Note that an even more
restrictive provision could allow or even mandate the refusal to recognize the
compensatory aspect of the judgment.
230. Brand, supra note 199, at 194.
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difficult to deny enforcing U.S. punitive damages awards for the
same type of violation. The same cannot be said for the current
language of the Hague Convention.
If, however, those seeking to amend the Hague Convention
find that the 1999 draft language would not allow sufficiently
liberal enforcement of reasonable U.S. punitive damages
awards, the United States could encourage the use of the same
“manifestly contrary” standard used in the Brussels Regulation
or the “contrary” language used in the Lugano Convention.231
Remember that European States apply that exception to avoid
enforcement sparingly.232 Because the “manifestly contrary”
standard is a more liberal standard of enforcement than the
discarded draft language of the Hague Convention, however, the
United States might face strong opposition by E.U. Member
States to the inclusion of that language in any future
amendments to the Hague Convention.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whatever amendment the United States seeks, Member
States need not fear the prospect of having to enforce huge
punitive damages awards for three reasons. First, the United
States Supreme Court has restricted punitive damages, in most
cases, to a ratio of less than or equal to nine-to-one.233
Additionally, lower federal courts and state courts have further
limited punitive damages judgments.234 Second, Congress and
state legislatures have capped punitive damages in some
statutes and have created multipliers above which punitive
damages may not be awarded in others.235 Third, even under
231. Since the United States liberally enforces European judgments, this would
probably not dramatically affect enforcement in the United States.
232. See supra Part IV.A–B.
233. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)
(“Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still
achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution.”); see generally supra Part
II.a.
234. See supra Part II.B.
235. See supra Part II.C. That individual states—through their legislatures and
courts—have limited punitive damages awards may not help the United States
during possible future negotiations over the Hague Convention. The other side of
the bargaining table might well be reviewing the U.S. federal system, not individual
states’ systems. If amendments to the Hague Convention do not simply allow the
enforcement of U.S. punitive damages awards in E.U. countries, the amendments
should, at the very least, require a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis. That way,
states with stricter laws with respect to punitive damages awards will reap the
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the liberal enforcement scheme of the Brussels Regulation, no
State need enforce a damage award that is “manifestly contrary”
to that State’s public policy.236
What the U.S. should ask for, and what the U.S. should
receive, is nothing more, but also nothing less, than the respect
that European countries accord each other. Many Member
States can no longer demur and repeat the mantra that their
law authorizes only compensatory damages.
Thus, U.S.
punitive damages judgments are no longer aberrant in
worldwide jurisprudence.237 Even States such as Germany that
do not allow non-compensatory damages have indicated that
their courts may enforce some non-compensatory damages.238
In one respect, those who seek reciprocity in enforcement
were once right in saying that the United States gave up a
bargaining chip when its courts began liberally enforcing foreign
judgments without requiring reciprocal treatment for U.S.
judgments.239 The United States’ liberal enforcement of money
judgments probably lessened Member States’ desire to write a
broad enforcement provision for judgments containing punitive
damages. In another respect, however, the United States was
not giving up anything in Article 11 of the Hague Convention.
After all, few E.U. judgments explicitly contained punitive
damages, and even fewer of these judgments needed to be
enforced in the United States. Because the Hague Convention
runs bilaterally, U.S. courts may refuse to enforce an E.U.
Member State’s punitive damages judgment pursuant to Article
11.
The United States, however, should not stop enforcing
others’ judgments; rather E.U. Member States should start
In a world with increasing
enforcing U.S. judgments.240
amounts of cross-border transactions, it is imperative that
judgments can be enforced in countries other than the one
benefits of those stricter laws and may see their judgments enforced more readily in
E.U. countries than will those states with laxer rules and correspondingly higher
punitive damages awards.
236. Brussels Regulation, supra note 9, art. 34; see generally supra Part IV.A–B.
237. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 14, at 517–21.
238. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 709–10 (noting that German courts have
enforced small awards of punitive damages).
239. Danford, supra note 7; Ballard, supra note 21.
240. But see RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FED. STATUTE, supra note 154, § 7(a) (“A foreign judgment
shall not be recognized or enforced in a court in the United States if the court finds
that comparable judgments of courts in the United States would not be recognized or
enforced in the courts of the state of origin.”).
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handing down the judgments. If another round of negotiations
begins over the provisions of the Hague Convention, this author
hopes that both sides will be more informed about the trends in
punitive damages and will use that information to grant
reciprocal, uniform, and liberal enforcement to all foreign
judgments.

